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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Third-Party Defendant and Appellee Diversified Medical Products, Inc. 
("DMP") agrees with Plaintiff and Appellant E & M Sales West Inc. dba Heat 
Source's ("Heatsource") statement of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on Heatsource's 
breach of contract claim against DMP? 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on Heatsource's 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against DMP? 
3. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on Heatsource's 
claim for unjust enrichment against DMP? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For all three issues the standard of appellate review is identical. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). An 
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate granting of 
summary judgment for correctness, Massey v. Griffiths, 152 P. 3d 312, f 8 (Utah 
2007). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no 
deference is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Additionally, an appellate court 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn thereform in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 
at 233. 
The trial court signed an order granting summary judgment to DMP on all 
claims filed against it by Heatsource. (R. 955). This order preserved the issue for 
appeal. 
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
There are three rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal. 
They are Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A), 7(c)(3)(B) and 56(c). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) reads in its entirety: 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party 
contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated 
and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving 
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) reads in its entirety: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that 
is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional 
facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the 
grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set 
forth in the opposing memorandum each fact shall be separately stated 
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such 
as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) reads in its entirety: 
i 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about March 1, 2002 Heatsource filed a complaint against Defendant-
Appellee Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC ("Bechtel Jacobs"). (R. 1). No claims 
were alleged against DMP. On or about April 15, 2004 Heatsource filed an 
amended complaint against DMP alleging breach of contract, breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment. (R. 232). On or about 
August 17, 2005 DMP filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims 
against it. After briefing was completed and a hearing held, DMP's motion for 
summary judgment was granted on January 18, 2006. (R. 955). The case 
proceeded forward with the other parties and claims. The trial court ultimately 
dismissed all of Plaintiffs claims against all parties on August 2, 2007 (R.1561). 
On August 22, 2007 Heatsource filed its notice of appeal, which included 
appealing the order granting summary judgment to DMP. (R. 1569). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DMP in its summary judgment motion listed a number of substantive 
undisputed material facts determinative of Heatsource's claims against it. DMP 
i 
and Bechtel Jacobs entered into an agreement to provide a Salt Melting and 
Processing Probe System (the "System") to be used in Bechtel Jacob's completion 
of its project for the United States Department of Energy in Tennessee. (R. 232, f^ 
5). DMP subcontracted with DCS for DCS to produce the heaters that were part of 
the System. (R. 538, p.5 f^ 11). DCS then subcontracted with Heatsource to 
produce a five-zone heater as part of the system. (Id at J^ 12.) All work performed 
by Heatsource was part of Heatsource5s obligations under its subcontract with 
DCS. (Id., p.6 f 17). Heatsource was fully compensated under its subcontract with 
DCS for all work performed under the contract. (Id at % 20). 
No claim was originally filed against DMP or DCS. Heatsource's sole 
shareholder explained that no claims were filed against DMP or DCS because 
Heatsource was instructed to do specific work by Bechtel Jacobs' employees and 
told that Heatsource would be compensated for that and interfaced directly with 
Bechtel Jacobs' employees and so they didn't feel that DMP or DCS was bound in 
that transaction, because the instructions came directly from Bechtel Jacobs. (Id. at 
TJ 22). As it applies to this appeal against DMP, there was no contract between 
Heatsource and DMP. 
Heatsource opposed DMP's motion for summary judgment, but 
insufficiently to prevent summary judgment being appropriately granted against it. 
First, Heatsource failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Heatsource failed to 
include a verbatim restatement of each of DMP's facts that it believed to be 
controverted. (R. 717). Each fact set forth in a moving's party memorandum is 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. See Utah R. Civ. P. (c)(3)(A). Since Heatsource controverted 
none of DMP's undisputed material facts, they were deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment. 
After DMP's motion for summary judgment was granted, Heatsource filed a 
motion for reconsideration or new trial. (R. 929). In this filing, Heatsource 
provided additional facts that supported that there was no contract between 
Heatsource and DMP. Heatsource alleged that it did not have a written contract 
with DMP and the only written contract was a purchase order issued by DCS, 
which had been completed by Heatsource and paid for by DCS. (R 929, p.3 [^ 11). 
Heatsource did not provide any sufficient facts in opposing DMP's motion for 
summary judgment to establish any contract, express or implied, existed between 
Heatsource and DMP. Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed 
Heatsource's breach of contract claim against DMP. Since no contract existed 
between Heatsource and DMP, the trial court correctly dismissed Heatsource's 
claim against DMP for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, there was a written contract in place between Heatsource and DCS dealing 
with the subject matter of the lawsuit that would prevent Heatsource from 
maintaining a cause of action for unjust enrichment against DMP. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted DMP's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Heatsource's breach of contract claim because the undisputed facts demonstrated a 
contract did not exist between DMP and Heatsource. Since no contract existed 
between DMP and Heatsource, the trial court had no alternative but to dismiss 
Heatsource's claim against DMP for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. Finally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to 
DMP on Heatsource's unjust enrichment claim because there was an adequate 
remedy at law. Heatsource had an express written contract with DCS, and if 
Heatsource suffered any damages, it had an adequate remedy at law by suing DCS 
for breach of that contract. Heatsource could not maintain an unjust enrichment 
claim against DMP. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to DMP on 
all of Heatsource's claims. 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). Summary judgment determinations are made when 
"the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Yazd v. Woodside 
Homes Corp., 109 P.3d 393, 395 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). 
When filing a motion for summary judgment a moving party must comply 
with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7. A memorandum supporting a motion for 
summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the 
moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 7(c)(3)(A). DMP complied with this rule outlining 22 material facts of which 
it contends no genuine issue exists. (R. 538, p. 1-6). 
Heatsource's opposition to a motion for summary judgment was required to 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Heatsource did not 
comply with this requirement. (R. 717). Since Heatsource failed to controvert 
DMP's material facts, these facts were deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(c)(3)(A). 
Heatsource's complaint against DMP alleged causes of action for breach of 
contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Based on 
the undisputed material facts, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment 
on all of Heatsource's claims against DMP. 
A. The Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment on 
Heatsource's breach of contract claim against DMP. 
The elements of a breach of contract claim are "(I) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other 
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party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design. L.L.C., 20 P. 3d 388, 392 (Utah 
2001); See Nuttall v. Bernston, 30 P.2d 738, 741 (1934). Heatsource's breach of 
contract claim against DMP failed because it did not provide any facts that would 
establish a contract existed between Heatsource and DMP. A contract is the first 
element for a breach of contract claim. Bair, Id. 
The essential elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, competent parties 
and consideration. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1985). For an offer to be one that would create a valid and binding contract, its 
terms must be definite and unambiguous. PCM Inv. Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 
34 P.3d 785, f^ 12 (Utah 2001). An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all 
material terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance, 
or it is a rejection of the offer. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 
P. 2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). 
In the instant case there was no evidence that Heatsource offered to provide 
services to DMP, or DMP accepted an offer of Heatsource agreeing to price and 
method of performance. In its motion for summary judgment, DMP provided 
evidence as an undisputed material fact that DCS contracted with Heatsource in 
September 2000. (R. 538, p. 5 f 12). The work performed by Heatsource was part 
of Heatsource's obligations under its contract with DCS. (R. 538, p. 6 J^ 17). 
Heatsource was fully compensated under the contract with DCS for all work 
performed under the contract. (R. 538, f^ 20). Andrew Nelson, the sole 
shareholder and president of Heatsource testified that a claim was not filed against 
DCS because he was instructed to do specific work by employees of Bechtel 
Jacobs'. Heatsource was told it would be compensated for that,work. Heatsource 
then interfaced directly with Bechtel Jacobs' employees to deliver the products. (R. 
538, | 22). Nelson further testified that Heatsource did not feel that DMP or DCS 
was bound in that transaction, because the instructions came directly from Bechtel 
Jacobs. Id. 
Heatsource in opposing this motion did not controvert any of these facts. 
Accordingly, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A) they are deemed 
admitted. In its opposition, Heatsource did not allege any facts that if established 
would support a contract between Heatsource and DMP. In its brief Heatsource 
cites to one piece of evidence that it believes supports the position that there was a 
contract between Heatsource and DMP. Heatsource cites deposition testimony of 
Andrew Nelson where he alleged a representative of DMP was present when there 
was a discussion about working as a team to get Heatsource compensated for its 
work. See Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Even accepting this testimony as true, it does 
not establish a contract between Heatsource and DMP. There is no evidence of 
definite and unambiguous terms including price. It is clear that with the evidence 
before it, the trial court could only conclude that there was no contract between 
Heatsource and DMP and correctly granted summary judgment to DMP on 
Heatsource's breach of contract claim. 
Q 
B. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on 
Heatsource's claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing against DMP 
Where Heatsource cannot establish a contract with DMP, Heatsource is not 
able to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith against 
DMP. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing extends no further than the purposes and 
express terms of the contract/' Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Company, 84 
P. 3d 1154, 1160 (Utah 2003). The Court also held that "[u]nder the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, both parties to a contract impliedly promise not to 
intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of 
the contract." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 94 P. 3d 193, 197 (Utah 
2004) (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P. 2d 194, 199 
(Utah 1991). Without the existence of a contract, there cannot be an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Eggett v. Wasatch Energy 
Corporation, 94 P. 3d 193 (Utah 2004). 
It is undisputed that no contract existed between Heatsource and DMP. 
Since there is no contract between Heatsource and DMP, the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment on Heatsource's claim for breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
C. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on 
Heatsource's claim for unjust enrichment against DMP. 
Heatsource could not maintain an unjust enrichment claim against DMP 
because an actual contract existed which covered the required performance. The 
unjust enrichment doctrine exists to provide an equitable remedy where there is not 
a remedy at law. American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 
930 P. 2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court further explained in 
American Towers that "[i]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an 
express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment." Id. (citing Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P. 2d 461, 465 
(Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express 
contract covering the subject matter of the litigation."); Davies v. Olsen, 746 P. 2d 
264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)("Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that 
no enforceable written or oral contract exists.")). 
In DMP's motion for summary judgment, it provided as a statement of 
material fact that no genuine issue exists that a contract existed between 
Heatsource and DCS. (R. 538, p. 5 ^ f 11). The work performed by Heatsource was 
part of Heatsource's obligations under the contract with DCS. (R. 538, p. 6 f^ 17). 
Additionally, Heatsource was fully compensated under the contract with DCS for 
all work performed under the contract. Id. at % 20. Heatsource did not controvert 
any of these facts in opposing DMP's motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, each of these facts was deemed admitted pursuant to Civil Rule 
11 
7(c)(3)(A). Since there was an existing contract, an unjust enrichment claim 
cannot be maintained by Heatsource. 
Even assuming Heatsource could maintain an unjust enrichment claim, it has 
not provided any evidence that it could maintain such a claim against DMP. For 
Heatsource to maintain an unjust enrichment claim against DMP, it would have to 
establish three elements. First there must be a benefit conferred on DMP by 
Heatsource. See Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 12 P. 3d 580, 582 (Utah 
2000). Second, DMP must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. See Id. 
Third, there must be the acceptance or retention by DMP of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for DMP to retain the benefit without 
payment for its value. Id. 
Heatsource in its opposition to DMP's summary judgment motion and brief 
does not provide any evidence to establish any of the required elements for an 
unjust enrichment claim against DMP. All work performed by Heatsource was 
covered by Heatsource's agreement with DCS. Heatsource provided heaters to 
Bechtel Jacobs under its contract with DCS. Therefore, there is no evidence that 
DMP was conferred a benefit by Heatsource, DMP was not aware of any benefit 
conferred to it, and DMP has not retained any benefit. Under these circumstances, 
and based on the evidence submitted, DMP was entitled to summary judgment on 
Heatsource's claim for unjust enrichment against it. 
1? 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Third Party Defendant and Appellee Diversified 
Metal Products, Inc. respectfully requests this court to affirm the trial court's 
decision granting summary judgment to Diversified Metal Products, Inc. on all 
claims alleged against it by Plaintiff and Appellant E & M Sales West, Inc., dba 
Heatsource. 
DATED this / ] day of March 2008. 
DUNN & DUNN 
5VIN D. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
Diversified Metal Products, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E & M SALES WEST, INC., dba 
HEATSOURCE, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY, LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY, LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and DIVERSIFIED 
CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
DEFENDANT DIVERSIFIED 
METAL PRODUCTS, INC.'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020901874 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Diversified Metal Products, Inc. ("DMP"), by and through its counsel of record, Kevin D. 
Swenson, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby submits the 
following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INCORPORATION OF DEFENDANT BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant DMP hereby incorporates by reference all undisputed facts, allegations and 
arguments as set forth in Defendant Bechtel Jacob Company's ("Bechtel") Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment filed on or about August 12, 2005, in so much as the claims made 
by Plaintiff against DMP are derivative to Plaintiffs claims against BechteL 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from a contract entered into between Bechtel and DMP for the 
production of a salt melting and processing probe system. DMP then entered into a contract with 
Diversified Control Systems ("DCS") to produce heaters for part of the system. DCS entered 
into a contract with Plaintiff E & M Sales West, Inc. ("Heatsource") to specifically produce the 
heaters that would be included in the system. 
All work performed by Heatsource was covered by the express agreement with DCS. 
DMP did not enter into a contractual agreement with Heatsource at any time. There cannot be a 
breach of contract by DMP because there was not a contractual relationship between DMP and 
Heatsource. For this reason, Heatsource's first claim of breach of contract fails. 
Heatsource also claims that DMP breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. This claim also fails because there was no direct contract between Heatsource and 
? 
DMP. Without a direct contract, there cannot be an implied covenant. DMP, though not 
contractually bound, issued a request for equitable adjustment ("REA") to Bechtel on behalf of 
Heatsource for additional funds following completion of the project DMP did not have a duty to 
act in that manner. However, by doing so DMP exhibited its good faith in dealing with 
Heatsource in the course of the contract with DCS. 
Heatsource's third claim of unjust enrichment fails as a matter of law as well. Heatsource 
contracted with DCS to produce a heater for a heater probe system. An unjust enrichment claim 
fails where there is an express contract for the services. Heatsource and DCS entered into an 
agreement to produce heater probes as part of the contract between Bechtel and DMP. Where an 
express agreement exists, the claim for unjust enrichment fails. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact and DMP is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Therefore, DMP requests that summary judgment be entered in its favor against all 
claims by Heatsource. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
1. On or about March 1, 2002, E & M Sales West, Inc., dba Heatsource 
("Heatsource"), filed a Complaint in this matter against Bechtel 
2. On or about December 17, 2002, Heatsource filed an Amended Complaint against 
Bechtel. 
3. On or about October 15, 2003, Bechtel filed a Third-Party Complaint against 
DMP. 
4. The Third-Party Complaint of Bechtel against DMP had causes of action for 
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, indemnity, and declaratory 
relief. 
5. On or about April 15, 2004, Bechtel filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint 
against DMP and Diversified Control Systems, LLC ("DCS"). 
6. In its Amended Third-Party Complaint, Bechtel had causes of action against both 
DCS and DMP for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
indemnity, and declaratory relief. 
7. On or about June 14, 2004, Heatsource filed an Amended Complaint adding as a 
party, DMP. Heatsource asserted causes of action against DMP for breach of contract, good faith 
and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. 
8. On or about June 28, 2004, DMP filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint and 
a Counterclaim against Heatsource. DMP asserted a cause of action for unjust enrichment 
against Heatsource. 
9. On or about June 4, 2004, DCS filed a Cross-Claim against E&M Sales West, 
Inc., dba Heatsource. 
SUPPLEMENTAL UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
10. DMP and Bechtel entered into an agreement to provide a Salt Melting and 
Processing Probe System (the "System") to be used in BechteFs completion of its project for the 
United States Department of Energy in Tennessee. First Amended Complaint, \ 5; Affidavit of 
James H. Maupin ("Maupin Aff.") flf 3, 5. 
11. DMP subcontracted with DCS, and under that subcontract, DCS was required to 
produce the heaters that were part of the System. Deposition of Herb Pollard of DMP ("Pollard 
Depo."), 18:14-18 (Exhibit 1); Deposition of John Weeks of DCS ("Weeks Depo."), 67:24-25 
(Exhibit2); Deposition of Todd Lindstrom of DCS ("Lindstrom Depo."), 11:10-13; 12:19-13:9; 
43:23-44:2 (Exhibit 3); Deposition of Andrew Nelson of Heatsource ("Nelson Depo."), 192:24-
193:15 (Exhibit 4). 
12. DCS subcontracted with Heatsource in September 2000 to produce a five-zone 
heater as part of the System. Pollard Depo., 11:19-21; 31:15-32:2; 75:2-6 (Exhibit 1); Weeks 
Depo., 62:19-63:11 (Exhibit2); 68:1-2; Lindstrom Depo., 24:8-13; 41:11-23; 50:13-17 (Exhibit 
3); Deposition of Darin Wood of DCS ("Wood Depo"), 8:13-17; 84:4-11 (Exhibit 5); Nelson 
Depo., 149:1-2; 192:24-193:15; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). 
13. Under its subcontract, Heatsource was required to produce the heaters for the 
System and included the testing of such products. Wood Depo., 95:5-17; 96:4-19 (Exhibit 5); 
Nelson Depo., 194:11-14; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). 
14. The cost of building the System and all of the equipment and components as 
required by the contract specifications was within the scope of the contracts and subcontracts 
between Bechtel and DMP, DMP and DCS, and then DCS and Heatsource. Pollard Depo., 94:9-
18 (Exhibit 1). 
15. The production and testing of the heaters was included in the subcontract between 
DCS and Heatsource. Wood Depo., 95:5-17 (Exhibit 5); 96:4-19; Nelson Depo., 194:11-14; 
194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). 
16 . The specifications for the System did not change during performance of the 
contract. Pollard Depo, 40:14-19; 71:20-21; 72:11-17; 83:13-16 (Exhibit 1); Lindstrom Depo, 
50:25-51:4 (Exhibit 3); Wood Depo, 65:11-17; 91:21 (Exhibit 5); Nelson Depo, 197:22-24; 
Nelson Depo. II, 42:14-18 (Exhibit 4). 
17. The work performed by Heatsource was part of Heatsource's obligations under 
the subcontract with DCS. Pollard Depo, 76:17-23; 80:5-8 (Exhibit 1); Nelson Depo, 194:11-
14; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). 
18. Bechtel accepted the System on August 9, 2001. 
19. Heatsource did not ask for or request additional money until it submitted a request 
for equitable adjustment ("REA") throughDMP to Bechtel on August 23, 2001. Nelson Depo, 
195:11-18 (Exhibit 4); Pollard Depo, 53:16-54 2; 79:11-19 (Exhibit 1); Wood Depo, 64:16-22 
(Exhibit 5). 
20. Heatsource was fully compensated under the contract with DCS for all work 
performed under the contract. 
21. Andy Nelson was the sole shareholder for E & M Sales West, Inc. Nelson Depo, 
6:1-7 (Exhibit 4). 
22. Mr. Nelson testified that a claim was not filed against DCS because "we were 
instructed to do specific work by Bechtel Jacobs' employees and told that we would be 
compensated for that and - and then interfaced directly with Bechtel Jacobs' employees, deliver 
those products. And so we didn't feel that DMP or DCS was bound in that transaction, because 
the instructions came directly from Bechtel Jacobs." Nelson Depo, 14:10-24 (Exhibit 4), 
ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to a 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
matter of law," Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). Summary judgment determinations 
are made when "the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 109 
P.3d 393, 395 (Utah Ct App. 2005) (citations omitted). 
DMP's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as a matter of law based upon 
the lack of a contract between Heatsource and DMP. Accordingly, DMP is entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing it from this matter, with prejudice, and an award for attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
B« Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim Fails because No Contract Exists 
between DMP and Heatsource. 
The undisputed facts show that a contract did not exist between DMP and Heatsource. 
The elements required for a breach of contract claim are "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the 
party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. 
Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001); see Nuttall v. Berntson, 30 P.2d 738, 741 
(1934). 
The chain of contracts and subcontracts is not disputed. Bechtel entered into a contract 
with DMP. Maupin Aff. YJ 3, 5. DMP then subcontracted with DCS to produce a portion of the 
System. Pollard Depo., 18:14-18 (Exhibit 1); Weeks Depo., 67:24-25 (Exhibit 2); Lindstrom 
Depo., 11:10-13; 12:19-13:9; 43:23-44:2 (Exhibit 3); Nelson Depo, 192:24-193:15 (Exhibit 4). 
DCS entered into a subcontract with Heatsource to develop the heaters for the System. Pollard 
Depo, 11:19-21; 31:15-32:2; 75:2-6 (Exhibit 1); Weeks Depo, 62:19-63:11; 68:1-2 (Exhibit 2); 
Lindstrom Depo, 24:8-13; 41:11-23; 50:13-17 (Exhibit 3); Wood Depo, 8:13-17; 84:4-11 
(Exhibit 5); Nelson Depo, 149:1-2; 192:24-193:15; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). DMP was not, at 
any time, party to a direct contract with Heatsource. In order for DMP to breach a contract with 
Heatsource, the primary element necessary is a contract. However, a written contract was not 
entered into between DMP and Heatsource. Additionally, Andy Nelson testified that there was 
not an oral contract between Heatsource and DMP. Nelson Depo, 14:10-24 (Exhibit 4). Thus, it 
is not necessary to evaluate the other required elements for a breach of contract claim. All work 
performed by Heatsource was covered under its contract with DCS. 
A contract can not be implied to exist between DMP and Heatsource. All specifications 
regarding the Heatsource's performance under the contract, including compensation, was 
controlled by its contract with DCS. Plaintiff cannot impliedly make DMP a party to the contract 
that it entered into with DCS. In addition, the work specifications did not change at any time 
during Heatsource's performance. Pollard Depo, 40:14-19; 71:20-21; 72:11-17; 83:13-16 
(Exhibit 1); Lindstrom Depo, 50:25-51:4 (Exhibit 3); Wood Depo, 65:11-17; 91;21 (Exhibit 5); 
Nelson Depo, 197:22-24 (Exhibit 4); Nelson Depo. H, 42:4-18 (Exhibit 4). All work performed 
by Heatsource was specified in the contract with DCS, Therefore, not only was there no direct 
contract between Heatsource and DMP, but where the work performed by Heatsource was 
included in its contract with DCS, there cannot be an implied contract between Heatsource and 
DMP. For this reason, Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract by DMP fails and a summary 
judgment should be granted. 
C Plaintiffs Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim Fails Because No 
Contract Exists Between DMP and Heatsource, 
Where Heatsource is not able to prove an express contract with DMP, Heatsource is not 
able to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against 
DMP. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he reach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing extends no further than the purposes and express terms of the contract." Smith v. 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Company, 84 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Utah 2003). The Court also held that 
"[ujnder the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both parties to a contract impliedly promise 
not to intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the 
contract." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 94 P.3d 193, 197 (Utah 2004) (citing St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. V. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
Without the existence of a contract, there cannot be an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
The pleadings and facts show that Heatsource's only contractual relationship was with 
DCS. Pollard Depo, 11:19-21; 31:15-32:2; 75:2-6 (Exhibit 1); Weeks Depo, 62:19-63:11; 68:1-
2 (Exhibit 2); Lindstrom Depo, 24:8-13; 41:11-23; 50:13-17 (Exhibit 3); Wood Depo, 8:13-17 
(Exhibit 5); 84:4-11; Nelson Depo, 149:1-2; 192:24-193:15; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). All of 
the work required to build the System, including procedures to test the System, was included in 
Heatsource's contract with DCS. Pollard Depo., 94:9-18 (Exhibit 1); Wood Depo., 95:5-17 
(Exhibit 5); 96:4-19; Nelson Depo., 194:11-14; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). The only time 
Heatsource acted with DMP was while submitting the REA to Bechtel. Nelson Depo., 195:11-
18 (Exhibit 4); Pollard Depo., 53:16-54:2 (Exhibit 1); Wood Depo., 64:16-22 (Exhibit 5). 
Although there was not an agreement between the parties, DMP acted beyond any duty it would 
have to Heatsource by filing the request. DMP was not under any duty to act in this manner. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
present between Heatsource and DMP and summary judgment is appropriate. 
Even if a contract were found to exist between DMP and Heatsource, DMP's actions in 
respect to the REA show that it did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. DMP 
complied with its contract with Bechtel by providing the System. DMP complied with its 
contract with DCS by providing payment for DCS's work under the subcontract. DMP did 
nothing to harm Heatsource's right to benefit from the contract with DCS. DMP did not breach 
any alleged covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Heatsource and summary judgment 
should be granted. 
D. Plaintiffs Unjust Enrichment Claim Fails Because Heatsource Entered Into 
a Contract to Produce the System, 
Plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment cannot be pursued in this case because an actual 
contract existed which covered the required performance. The unjust enrichment doctrine exists 
to provide an equitable remedy when there is not a remedy at law. American Towers Owners 
Assoc, Inc. v. CCIMechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme 
in 
Court further explained in American Towers that "[i]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach 
of an express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment/' Id. 
(citing Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi 
contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the 
litigation;'); Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Recovery under 
quantum meriut presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists/')) 
All work performed by Heatsource was subject to the express contract with DCS. There 
is no dispute regarding the chain of contracts and subcontracts involved in this case. Maufin Aff 
1fl[ 3, 5; Pollard Depo., 11:19-21; 18:14-18; 31:15-32:2; 75:2-6 (Exhibit 1); Weeks Depo., 62:19-
63:11; 67:24-25; 68:1-2 (Exhibit 2); Lindstrom Depo., 11:10-13; 12:19-13:9; 24:8-13; 41:11-23; 
43:23-44:2; 50:13-17 (Exhibit 3); Wood Depo., 8:13-17; 84:4-11 (Exhibit 5); Nelson Depo., 
149:1-2; 192:24-193:15; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). Under the express contract with DCS, 
Heatsource was required to produce and test the heaters for the System. Wood Depo., 95:5-17; 
96:4-19 (Exhibit 5); Nelson Depo., 194:11-14; 194:24-195:6 (Exhibit 4). All specifications and 
requirements were included in the contract with DCS. Pollard Depo., 94:9-18 (Exhibit 1). In 
addition, Heatsource was compensated in full for work performed under the contract by DCS. 
Undisputed Facts 19. Where the work was controlled by the specifications in the agreement with 
DCS, Heatsource cannot claim that any additional work performed by them unjustly enriched any 
party to this suit. 
Since the work performed by Heatsource was contained in an express agreement and 
conducted in accordance with that agreement, Heatsource cannot claim unjust enrichment against 
DMP. Summary judgment is appropriate and should be granted against Heatsource's third cause 
of action against DMP. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons described above, DMP requests that the Court grant its Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Heatsource and enter judgment in DMP's favor on all counts. DMP 
is entitled to summary judgment dismissing it from this matter, with prejudice, and an award for 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2005. 
STJ1TTER AXLAND, PLLC 
By- /-Q*^^ 
JXlichael W. Homer 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Kevin D. Swenson 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third Party-
Defendants Diversified Metal Products, Inc. 
and Diversified Control Systems, LLC 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be 
served via, first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Garrett & Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
E & M Sales West Inc. dba Heatsource 
Brent Johnson 
Bryan K. Benard 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BechtelJacobs Company LLC 
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ADDENDUM "2 
Edward M. Garrett, #1163 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Facsimile: (801) 581-1168 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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EST THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E & M SALES WEST INC., dba 
HEATSOURCE, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC., a 
Idaho corporation, and DIVERSIFIED 
CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, 
INC. (DMP) 
Case No.: 020901874 
Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
X/<^ 
1. Plaintiff adopts by reference the Affidavit of Andrew R. Nelson filed in this action and 
the Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant 
Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (BJC) in so far as matters between DMP and Plaintiff are 
concerned. 
2. In regard to the introduction, procedural facts and supplemental undisputed material 
facts set forth in the Motion and Memorandum of DMP, Plaintiff does not agree with those 
statements of DMP because they totally fail to discuss the facts that show that DMP is liable to 
Plaintiff Plaintiffs position in this regard will be demonstrated below. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
L Diversified Metal Products, Inc. (DMP) and Diversified Control Systems (DCS) are 
sister companies. Todd Lindstrom of DCS who is close to this project testified: 
"Q All right. I have been led to believe that there is now a connection 
between DCS and DMP. Do you know what is? By that I mean a 
corporate connection. 
A We share a common owner. 
Q Okay. When did that occur, do you know? 
A 2000." 
2. During 2000, Plaintiff had considerable telephone contact with Todd Lindstrom, John 
Weeks and Darin Wood of BJC concerning a high temperature heater to be used in a probe 
system for melting salt in a reactor (See Depo. of Andrew Nelson). 
3. All information supplied to Heatsource to produce the heater was verbal. No written 
specifications were ever provided to Heatsource for the design and manufacture of the first 
generation heater (Affidavit of Andrew Nelson). 
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4. Heatsource did produce and test a single zone heater and supplied written test data. 
5. A critical factual issue in this case relates to the maximum temperature of the heater. 
Andrew Nelson, in his Affidavit, states that the temperature given by DCS was 650°C (1200°F). 
The heater was manufactured by Heatsource to a maximum temperature of 650°C and tested to 
that temperature for the time required by DCS. The test results are attached to the Affidavit of 
Andrew Nelson. 
6. Although unknown to Andrew Nelson at the time, the written specification provided 
by Bechtel through DMP to DCS was ambiguous according to Todd Lindstrom. Todd Lindstrom 
testified regarding the BJC spec, states: 
"Q Then if you run that up to 800 degrees Celsius using that wire capacity 
it's going to melt, isn't it? 
MR. BENARD: Objection, -
A Yes. 
MR. BENARD: — calls for speculation. 
MR. GARRETT: You can answer. 
A Yeah. 
Q (By Mr. Garrett) Is that an ambiguity in the spec. 
MR. SWENSON: Objection, calls for speculation and lacks 
foundation. 
A Yeah." (Depo. Pg. 23-24 Ln.21 and Pg. 24 Ln. 1) 
7. The purchase order issued to Heatsource does not contain heat parameters and is 
deficient. According to Lindstrom, that is not the way that DCS would now issue a purchase 
order: 
"Q Okay. In your judgment is this purchase order, which is shown on page 
1018, complete without containing some statement about the capacity of 
these heaters: 
A With today's, the way we send out PO's today, no. We have a three 
page write-up we do detailing what we'll do, what they'll do, what we 
won't do." 
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"Q (By Mr. Garrett) Would you have attached the spec? 
A Yeah." (Depo. Pg. 44 Ln. 15 - 25 and Pg. 45 Ln. 1) 
8. Further testimony of Todd Lindstrom is important. 
"Q But that's at 1200 degrees Fahrenheit, Can you read that? 
A Yeah, the sheath temperature at 1200. 
Q Doesn't that suggest to you that the heaters would have a capacity of 
1200 degrees Fahrenheit? 
A Not necessarily. It could mean that he was going the run them to a 1200 
degrees Fahrenheit and see that we didn't have a larger Delta T than 300. 
Q Would it also suggest to you that you had told him that the capacity of 
the heater would be 1200 degrees Fahrenheit? 
MR. SWENSON: Objection, asked and answered. 
You can go ahead and answer it. 
A It could." (Depo. Pg. 34 Ln. 13-25 and Pg. 35 Ln. 1) 
9. The above is clear evidence of the fact that although not furnished to Heatsource, 
BJC heater specs, were ambiguous and the purchase order issued by DCS was silent on heater 
temp. 
10. Nonetheless, Heatsource manufactured and tested the probe through the 1200°F 
temperature given to it by Todd Lindstrom. 
11. DCS accepted the test results and eventually paid Heatsource the full amount of its 
purchase order without deduction. 
12. It may be inferred that the testing and written results of the testing given to DMP and 
thence to BJC. 
13. Things changed on April 27, 2001. On that date, DMP issued a new heater 
specification requiring a heater temperature of 800°C (Exhibit "A", attached hereto). Heatsource 
was never given any notice of the change. 
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14. The initial 5-zone heaters designed and manufactured pursuant to the DCS purchase 
order were delivered in May, 2001. When tested at the DMP facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho, they 
reached the 650°C temperature but failed between 720°C and 780°C (See letter from Darin Wood 
dated August 21, 2001 Exhibit "B"). Of course they failed. They were taken to a temperature far 
above the 650°C design temperature. 
15. BJC was now demanding a heater with a capacity of800°C. Before the first 
generation heaters failed, this was never a requirement. According to Todd Lindstrom, 800°C 
was only a "worst case scenario" (Depo. Pg. 28 Ln. 3). 
16. BJC was never entirely clear as to the temperature that the heater had to attain. In a 
drawing by engineer Hylton of a probe heater (provided to Plaintiff only in discovery in this 
lawsuit), a heater temperature of 500°C is mentioned (a copy of the drawing is attached as Exhibit 
"C"). On July 25, 2000, engineer Hylton sent an email to Darin Wood of DCS explaining the 
temperature. He states that the heater must operate at 600°C while emerged in molten salt and 
further states that convective heat transfer to water assembly to that in molten salt and will permit 
the heaters to remain below 800°C in the salt (See Exhibit "D" attached hereto.) Finally in April, 
2001, a temperature of 800°C was stated (See Exhibit "A"). This document was first provided to 
Plaintiff in discovery in this case. 
17. The uncertainty as to temperature expressed by BJC is carried through to DMP and 
DCS as late as July 26, 2001 at a time when the second-generation U-bent heaters were nearing 
completion. Herb Pollard of DMP requested to know the operational rated temperature of the 
heaters (See Exhibit "E", attached) by email to Robert Szozda of BJC. Szozda replied that the 
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operational temperature is 800°C assuming foil power test requires lowering of the temperature 
reading. 
18. When an attempt was made in Idaho to make the heaters reach 800°C, they failed. The 
failure prompted meetings at Idaho Falls, Idaho in May and June of 2001 and on June 27, 2001 at 
Idaho Falls, Idaho a meeting was held at DMP and attended by Rick Dearholt and Robert Szozda 
of BJC, Darin Wood of DCS and Herb Pollard of DMP and others. This meeting was attended by 
Andrew Nelson and Willie Hazel of Plaintiff. Plaintiff presented a prototype of a new generation 
heaters using U-bent technology. Other options were also discussed. Finally, Rick Dearholt and 
Robert Szozda of BJC accepted the prototype and stated that if Plaintiff could produce the 
heaters within a specified time that BJC would pay for this new additional work. At another 
meeting that day, Plaintiff had discussions with Herb Pollard of DMP and Darin Wood of DCS 
relative to the new heater. Herb Pollard also told Andrew Nelson that Heatsource would be 
compensated for this new work. 
Andrew Nelson testified as follows: 
"Q. Herb never told you that DMP was going to pay you, did he? 
A. We had specific discussions after that 27th meeting. I think Darin — 
Darin was there — was there and we were — as, well, and we were 
discussing how we were basically — the administration of this and 
Herb, you know, emphasized the — emphasized the team concept in 
making the - the goals of Bechtel and joint goals of all involved at 
that point. And assured us that — you know, assured me specifically 
that we would — you know, working together both as a team to solve 
the technical issue and working as a team to get along with Bechtel's 
acknowledgement that we were going to — we'd be compensated for 
our work." (Depo. Pg. 67 Ln. 11-25 and Pg. 68 LIL 1) 
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19. Heatsource did not work on the second-generation heaters until both BJC and DMP 
promised payment. 
20. The new U-bent technology heaters were completed and delivered in a timely manner 
and tested at Idaho Falls, Idaho. They were accepted by BJC and used successfully in the Salt 
Melter Project. 
Heatsource evidence has shown that both BJC and DMP promised payment if Heatsource 
would produce a new generation heater with a heat capacity of 800°C. Heatsource complied. 
However, neither BJC or DMP paid and this lawsuit followed. 
PLAINTIFFS CAUSES OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract 
DMP had contracted with BJC to supply a probe system of which the heater made by 
Plaintiff is part. The Plaintiff produced the original heater in strict compliance with the verbal 
instructions given by DCS. Plaintiff designed and manufactured a heater with a capacity of 650°C 
(1200°F). Plaintiff tested the heater to that capacity and forwarded the test results to DCS. No 
comment or complaint was made about the first generation heater and the test results. Eventually, 
DCS fully paid Heatsource for this work. 
However, shortly before the heaters were delivered, DMP changed the heat requirement 
to 800°C. When the original heaters were tested in Idaho, they failed between 720°C and 780°C, 
which would be expected because they exceeded the design capacity of the original heaters. This 
prompted a meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho where Plaintiff was told to produce a new generation of 
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heater using different technology. Plaintiff was told by BJC and DMP that it would be paid for 
the new work. Plaintiff did perform timely and the new heaters were used successfully by BJC. 
However, neither DMP or BJC paid. Both BJC and DMP entered into a verbal contract 
with Plaintiff and both Defendants breached the contract by failure to pay. 
The above facts are found in the evidence produced to date in this case as shown above. 
If Defendants dispute this evidence, that merely creates questions a fact for the jury. The case 
cannot be determined at this juncture as a matter of law. This does not require a long citation of 
cases. It is fundamental in the law that if there is a request to produce a product and promises to 
pay therefore and the other party performs, it creates an offer, acceptance and promised 
consideration. 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
This cause of action is separate and distinct from the other causes (See Eggett v. Wasatch 
Energy Corporation, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 16). 
DMP was on the hook to BJC to produce a sophisticated probe containing heaters for use 
in the nuclear cleanup at Oakridge, Tennessee. When the heaters were received in Idaho and 
tested to a temperature beyond the 650°C design temperature given to Heatsource by DCS, they 
failed. This caused a serious problem for DMP. It had only recently changed the heat spec, to 
800°C and did not inform Heatsource of that fact. It faced time constraints and if BJC went to 
another vendor and paid some exorbitant price, BJC would simply deduct the amount paid from 
whatever it owed DMP. Therefore, DMP (and BJC) readily accepted the new U-bent technology 
proposed by Plaintiff and both agreed to pay therefor. The new heaters were successful, but 
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neither BJC nor DMP paid. DMP and BJC adopted a ploy to avoid payment. They simply 
contend that the heat parameters never changed between the first and second-generation heaters 
and therefore they didn't have to pay. That position ignores all of the evidence produced to date 
in this lawsuit. DMP urged Plaintiff to produce the second-generation heater after seeing the 
prototype, accepted them on delivery, and tested them to 800°C. They were used in the cleanup 
process. DMP has as duty to act in good faith in this matter. It breached that duty by adopting 
the spurious position that nothing had changed, and they didn't have to pay. 
Unjust Enrichment 
This is an alternative claim. Rule 8(a) of U.C.R.P. provides: 
"Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) 
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded/' 
If the jury were to find that there were not a contract between DMP and Plaintiff for the 
design and manufacture and delivery of second-generation heaters, nonetheless, it is evident that a 
benefit was conferred upon DMP. DMP was obligated to furnish the heater under its contract 
with BJC and if it failed to do so, it would be subject to a damage claim. When DCS tested the 
first generation heaters to a temperature far above 650°C (the original temperature given to 
Plaintiff by DCS) the heaters failed. This created a substantial problem for DMP. It was 
obligated to produce the heater for BJC with a capacity of 800°C. It had adopted that 
temperature shortly before the original heaters were delivered in Idaho. 
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At the high level meeting held in Idaho, Plaintiff produced a prototype of a second-
generation heater involving U-bent technology. DMP urged Plaintiff to produce that heater 
because that would relieve DMP of a substantial problem. Plaintiff contends that DMP promised 
to pay for this new heater. If, however, the jury would find that no contract existed between 
Plaintiff and DMP, still the jury could find that Plaintiff relieved DMP of a substantial financial 
burden and DMP was thereby enriched and should pay damages sustained by Plaintiff. This sound 
equitable document is set forth in 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts §9 - Unjust 
enrichment: 
"The phrase "unjust enrichment" is defined as the unjust retention of a 
benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another 
against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. 
Unjust enrichment describes a recovery for the value of the benefit retained when 
there is no contractual relationship, but when, on the grounds of fairness and 
justice, the law compels the performance of a legal and moral duty to pay. Unjust 
enrichment implies a contract so that one party may recover damages from 
another. Unjust enrichment also applies wherever justice requires compensation 
to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is 
available by action on the contract. The unjust enrichment theory does not 
require any promise or privity between the parties." 
As the evidence set forth above shows, that principle is at work here. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion of DMP for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this F/__ day of September, 2005. 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
Edward M. 'Garrett ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this u\ day of September, 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC. (DMP) to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Bryan Benard 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 East South Temple #2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael W. Homer 
Kevin D. Swenson 
SUITTERAXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
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DMP INC. 1 
] Page 3 OF 4 j 
DATE 
1 4/27/01 j 
1 ,' .DIVERSIFIED MUB1AJL, l 
PRODUCTS INC. 
Job # N3048 
Test Plan | 
REVISION 
B J 
3.4Test requirements 
3.4.1 Probe 
_ a^Jieaters reach 8QQ^C. 
b. Outside surface of the probe is within 150° of the heater 
element. 
c. Annular space of the probe, maintain a leak rate of less than 1 
x 10"5 std cm3/s at 50-psig differential pressure. 
d. O-Ring seal assembly to the probe of less then 1 x 10~3 std 
cm3/s at 1 atm differential pressure. 
3.4.2 Enclosure 
a. SCS to the Enclosure double seal with a maximum leak rate of 
1 x 10"5 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential pressure. 
b. SCS to the Maintenance shield a maximum leak rate of 
1 x 10~2 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential pressure. 
c. The Enclosure itself must maintain a leak rate of not greater 
than 0.05 volume % air/h for 12 hours at a pressure differential 
of-1 in. of water, by gage. 
e. Electrical feed throughs provide a seal with a leak rate of not 
greater than 1 x 10~3 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential pressure. 
d. The off gas line and the 3" ball valve will be heat traced to 
maintain a temperature of not less than 150°F. 
e. Double flange seal on both flanges of the 3" ball valve with a 
Leak rate of less than 1 x 10~5 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential 
pressure. 
f. Double o-ring seal at the top of the 3" ball valve with a leak 
test port. The o-rings will be designed to operate at 175°F and 
be capable of withstanding short temperature excursions up to 
482°F. 
3.4.3 Cask 
a. Cask to Enclosure leak rate of not greater than 0.05 volume % 
air/h for 12 hours at a pressure differential of-1 in. of water, by 
gage. 
b. Cask with the closure plate on the end flange shall have a leak 
rate not greater thanl x 10~5 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential 
pressure. 
c. A load cell that measures the tension in the hoist cable. 
d. An encoder that measures the vertical position of the probe. 
e. An up-travel switch with a redundant back up switch. 
3.4.4 SCS 
a. Double seal Helicoflex seal at both ends that will have a leak 
rate not greater thanl x 10~5 std cm3/s at 1 atm differential 
pressure. 
DTV-0473 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Bechtel Jacobs LLC August 21, 2001 
PO Box 4699 
Trailer-7078A, MS-6402 
Oak Ridge, TN 37831 
Attn: J. Rick Dearholt 
Subject: Heater Assembly Technical Status for MS RE Project 
This letter is in response to our conversation this morning regarding the Status of the 
Heater Assembly and the Technical hurdles and issues we have faced and are resolving. 
With the knowledge that the heater performance of the probe is the most critical element 
of the project, DCS decided that it was in the best interest of the project to contract out 
the design and the manufacture of the heater to a company that has the background and 
skills in the process heating industry. Through conversations with several companies in 
this industry we selected Heatsource of Salt Lake City because of their knowledge and 
superior solution to our application. 
This Heater configuration and application has breached current technology and continues 
to require extensive testing and development. Both Heatsource and Dalton, the Cartridge 
Heater manufacture, are not aware of any prior applications that have the same or similar 
requirements in the design of the heater assembly. This unique design has required DCS 
and Heatsource to tackle several issues that are similar to an R&D environment. The 
stacked zone configuration combined with a relatively large diameter tube running down 
the center combined with power / sensor bundles being routed in a high heat area 
longitudinally through the center is an unusual configuration. The exposure of terminal 
zones to extreme heat created several problems that contradicted normal specifications 
for components and materials used in the probe. 
The following issues have been recognized and we have assigned solutions to them. First 
was the power distribution system to each of the heater zones. We were experiencing 
failures in the power distribution bussing because of expansion and drifting of the power 
buss bars between the zones over the temperature range. The tight space tolerances of the 
design and allowable space within the probe tip require that clearances be stabilized in 
that section to maintain electrical isolation phase to phase and to the probe sheath. Our 
resolution to the issue was to utilize a dry fiber insulation media, which provides 
structural stabilization as well as electrical isolation for the buss. 
The next issue was the connection of the High Temperature Wire to the Cartridge heaters. 
We were experiencing failures just above the connection of the wire and the buss. A 
special connector had to be fabricated for these High Temperature conditions. 
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The current issue being addressed is a failure within the heater cartridges themselves. 
Heatsource and Dalton have both come to the conclusion that the Ferrell that delivers the 
power to the nichrome element in the cartridge is melting and creating a short to the 
inside wall of the cartridge. We are experiencing failures between the temperatures of 
720' and 780' C in a repeatable pattern. We believe that the failure is caused by an 
increase in resistance through the ferrel as temperature increases in the terminal area. 
Toward the upper limits of the test the resistance reaches a critical point at which the 
ferrel becomes a source of additional heat and liquefies. This liquid then migrates through 
the Mgo and Ceramic materials until it makes electrical contact with the heater sheath. At 
this point we see a catastrophic failure of the elements, which is detected by the over 
current monitoring equipment and electrical power is automatically removed from the 
zone. 
The solution to this problem is to increase the amount of ampacity of the ferrel. We 
investigated the use of a solid pin. This is not possible due to the manufacturing methods 
of the component. The process does allow for a pin insert to be used. This new insert 
configuration is being tested at this time. The additional wall thickness should provide 
increased ampacity resulting in reduced heat generated by the conductors eliminating the 
problem. 
We appreciate your patience in allowing us time to resolve these unforeseen technical 
challenges. Feel free to give me a call at any time to further discuss these issues. 
Sincerely, 
Darin J. Wood 
General Manager 
Cc: Herb Pollard - DMP 
Andy Neilson - Heatsource 
EXHTBTT "C" 
1/4" OD stainless steel 
tube stub (4" long) 
Healer 1 Thermocouple (K) 
Heater 2 Thermocouple (K) 
= 0 
Heater 1 power leads 
1-1/2" Sch-40 Pipe 
(material Stainless Steel) 
vv>^ 
Openings for power 
& TC leads 
^ ) 
1/4rt bolt-on cover plate 
(slip fit on 1/2" pipe - provides 
lateral support at top) 
1/2" Sch-80 Pipe 
(material Stainless Steel) 
Note: Wind tubular heaters for thermal 
contact with outer pipe 
Heater #2 1200W, 120 V at 500 degC 
(In upper 6" zone) 
Heater #1 1500W, 120 V at 500 degC 
(in lower 6" zone) 
1/4" weld ring Stainless Steel 
(to seal annulus) 
SALT MELTER PROTOTYPE PROBE 
FABRICATION CONCEPT 
12/8/98 J.O. Hylton 
FYT-TTRTT "TV 
Darin J, Wood 
From: Hylton, James O. (HYL) [hyl@bechteljacobs.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2000 2:40 PM 
To: ,darin@divcontroLcom' 
Cc: Szozda, Robert Michael (ZOZ); Maupin, James Howard (MPN) 
Subject: RE: 60% Design review comments reply 
Darin 
Thanks for the response. Here are my answers to your questions on my 
questions; 
1. Your terminilogy is fine. We'll change to your's. (LCP is in 19" 
inst rack 200ft away, etc) 
2. We want manual heater control from the LCP, so however you arrange the 
equipment to achieve that is fine. 
We would prefer that the LCP be mounted in a 19" rack. This will be 
the operator interface during operation 
of the probe. Under normal circumstances no personnel will be near 
the probe after it has been installed. 
3. OK 
4. OK 
5. My question was concerned with the sustained operation survivability of 
the heaters if they are not tested for 
1000 hours in the full probe configuration during the thermal 
performance test . If it can be established that 
the heater or heating elements are of a proven design that have the 
desired long term operating characteristics 
under similar conditions of power and temperature, then this concern 
might be satisfied without long term tests 
on the probe. Ask the Heat Source folks what they think needs to be 
done to establish long term survivability..., 
As to specific data requirements, all we really need to know is that 
the probe heaters will operate at full power 
for 1000 hours while immersed in molten salt at 600 degC. We must rely 
on the expertise of HeatSource to determine 
how to meet this objective and what test data is needed to support 
their design. 
For your informationn, The thermal performance requirement {SGC. 
2.5.2.4) for operation in water at full power with less 
than 150 degC difference between the heater and the outside of the 
probe is aimed at limiting the heater temperatures 
to a level compatible with conventional "calrod" heaters. Since the 
convective heat transfer to water is similar to that in 
molten salt, this will permit the heaters to remain below 800C in the 
salt. If the HeatSource heaters can operate at higher 
temperatures, then the 150 deg differential can be increased. 
Regards 
Jim 
T7YUTRTT " F " 
From: "Szozda, Robert Michael (ZOZ)" <zoz@bechteljacobs.org> 
To: •Herb Pollard1 <HerbP@diversifiedmetal.com>, <maupinjh@bechteljacobs.org> , 
Date: 7/26/01 4:12PM 
Subject: RE: PO 23900-PO-OR046F Heater Testing 
The Full Operational Temperature of the Probe as requested in the contract 
is 800 degrees C (Assuming the full power test does not require a lowering 
of the temperature rating). As previosly mentioned by DMP and DCS - Running 
the actual probes at this temperature will bake out the binder in the power 
leads causing brittle insulation and possible flaking and potentially 
degrade the connection at the bus bar. Due to various problems experienced 
during heater development and testing - The BJC wants a probe to run at full 
temperature in air to ensure the reliability of a five zone heater. The 
probe tested will be utilized as the spare. 
> —Original Message 
> From: Herb Pollard [SMTP:HerbP@diversifiedmetaLcom] 
> Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2001 4:09 PM 
> To: maupinjh@bechteljacobs.org 
> Cc: tubbjr@bechteljacobs.org; szozdarm@bechteljacobs.org; 
> darin@divcontrol.com; HUDS0NS@PWT0R.COM 
> Subject: Re: PO 23900-PO-OR046F Heater Testing 
> 
> Jim, 
> We have a question on item # 2 in the first section. What is the full 
> operational rated temperature? and if it is above 400 degrees C we 
> believe that the integrity of the heater units, specifically the-power to 
> bus connection, will be compromised. Let me know. 
> Thank You, 
> 
> 
> Herb Pollard III 
> Project Manager 
> Diversified Metal Products Inc. 
> 208-529-9655 
> 
> > » "Maupin, James Howard (MPN)" <mpn@bechteljacobs.org> 07/24/01 12:48PM 
> > » 
> Herb: 
> 
> Attached are the lasted direction relating to the Heater/Probe Testing. 
> 
> «probe4-072401.doc» 
> 
> James (Jim) H. Maupin 
> MSRE Procurement 
> Phone 865-241-2651 
> Fax 865-241-6707 
> E-mail, maupinjh@bechteljacobs.org 
CC: <tubbjY@bechteljacobs.org>, <szozdarm@bechte!jacobs org>, 
<darin@divcontrol.com>, <HUDSONS@PWT0R.COM> 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on November 21, 2005) 
THE COURT: We are here on the matter of E&M Sales 
West Incorporated, dba Heat Source vs. Bechtel Jacobs Company; 
and I guess it's versus Diversified Metal with the later 
amendment, (inaudible) that doesn't really express that, of 
course, we have the third-party complaints, case No. 020901874. 
Counsel, please state appearances. 
MR. SWENSON: Kevin Swenson on behalf of Diversified 
Metal Products and Diversified Control Systems. 
MR. BENARD: Bryan Benard of Holland and Hart on behalf 
of defendant Bechtel Jacobs Company. 
MR. GARRETT: Ed Garrett for the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, and I do appreciate 
the courtesy copies; and they were particularly helpful in this 
case, because frankly the pleading was a little unusual, a 
little convoluted, to say the least. Given the history of the 
case, this is a three-year old case; and we're here on summary 
judgment motions for both Bechtel Jacobs — I may refer to that 
as BJC. We've got to do initials here. Heat Source I think 
I'll list as the plaintiff, if that's okay — 
MR. GARRETT: That's all right. 
THE COURT: — Mr. Garrett? Then BJC, DMP and DCS — 
MR. 
THE 
SWENSON: 
COURT: -
C o r r e c t . 
- i s s o r t o f t h e way I ' v e m a p p e d i t o u t , 
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1 and spent quite a bit of time mapping it out. As sort of a 
2 preliminary observation, this is not —• some cases are just 
3 different to fit into a pigeon hole, but this is not a welfare 
4 case. Mr. Garrett, I say that not meaning any disrespect at 
5 all; but I sure as heck would never have dreamed that there was 
6 an actual contract claim directly Heat Source against BJC until 
7 one of your later memoranda, 
8 I'm very liberal on those pleadings, but I look at the 
9 causes of action in the amended complaint, and that is — it's 
10 really a second amended — well, I'm confused You amended 
11 your complaint, and then you did an amended complaint to assert 
12 a claim against Diversified, right? 
13 MR. GARRETT: That's correct. 
14 THE COURT. And m that, what I think you did was 
15 incorporate your prior amended complaint and add causes of 
16 action; is that uhe way you did that? 
17 MR GARRETT: Correct, (inaudible) 
18 THE COURT Okay. So going back to the original 
19 amended complaint that states expressly your causes of action 
20 against BJC, you of course have four causes of action. The 
21 first one is quantum meruit. Second one is it breaches implied 
22 covenant of good faith and fair dealing The third one is 
23 unjust enrichment. The fourth one is fraud. 
24 Any way I look at it and any way I consider the 
25 doctrines that fall under the general rules of (inaudible) 
- 4 -
1 contract, but are different, quantum meruit and unjust 
2 enrichment are the same cause of action 
3 Now, you may be thinking in terms of a contract 
4 implied in fact, but quantum meruit is a contract implied in 
5 law, with an unjust enrichment The treatises say so The law 
6 dictionary says so. Contract implied in law, one of the mam 
7 characteristics of it is it's not a contract. It's really a 
8 way to avoid an injustice and provide a remedy. 
9 Now, I think I hear you saying that your unjust 
10 — your quantum meruit claim is really a contract claim, a 
11 contract implied m fact Now, that's very important, because 
12 without that, really all you could possibly have I think 
13 against BJC is fraud, because you don't get unjust enrichment, 
14 because it's the contract that deals with the subject matter 
15 I hope I'm not making this more complicated than it 
16 is. I've spent a lot of hours on this, and you've spent three 
17 years on it. 
18 MR GARRETT That's fine, your Honor 
19 THE COURT: I see you have, but let me just ask you, 
20 then, and you can stand up, sit down, relax, I really don't 
21 I care. I just want to understand Are you now saying that 
22 first cause of action in the amended complaint is in fact a 
23 contract implied m fact9 
24 MR. GARRETT: Well, your Honor, I may have not made 
25 this as clear as I should have, but I think I have pled a 
-5-
1 contract breach. 
2 THE COURT: Where did you plead it? 
3 MR. GARRETT: Right from the facts, your Honor, 
4 THE COURT: Well, you've got to plead a cause of 
5 action. 
6 MR. GARRETT: I appreciate that, and I may be a little 
7 deficient there. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, tell me first the facts, and I'm fine 
9 with that, too, if it's there, what are the facts of a contract 
10 between BJC and Heat Source? A contract. I know you've got 
11 your fraud claim. I know you talk about unjust enrichment, and 
12 we'll have to talk about whether you can have unjust enrichment 
13 You know you can't have unjust enrichment if there's a contract 
14 that covers the subject matter. 
15 I guess the point for argument is whether that has 
16 to be a contract between you and BJC, or whether any contract 
17 covers the subject matter. Let's set that aside for the 
18 moment, and tell me what facts support a contract between BJC 
19 and Heat Source. 
20 MR. GARRETT: Well, the facts are these, your Honor; 
21 and I'll cut to the chase here, because they are complicated 
22 and there's a lot of detail we'd have to go into, but Heat 
23 Source received a purchase order from Diversified Control. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, DMC, uh-huh. 
25 MR. GARRETT: This was to make a sophisticated, very 
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1 high temperature heater. 
2 THE COURT: I understand. 
3 MR. GARRETT: And they made that heater according to 
4 the directions given by Diversified, and of course the dispute 
5 was all along the way here. 
6 THE COURT: I know there's all kinds, but whether there 
7 is the really material is the critical issue here, as you 
8 understand. 
9 MR. GARRETT: But anyhow, when they tested these 
10 heaters up in Idaho, they failed, and they failed — 
11 THE COURT: They failed over 700 degrees; and bhey 
12 thought they had been made at 650, but that doesn't answer my 
13 question about a contract with Heat Source unless you get into 
14 the 2001 dealings where they finally met with representatives 
15 of BJC. 
16 MR. GARRETT: That is correct. 
17 THE COURT: Is that where we're headed? 
18 MR. GARRETT: That's where we're headed. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. GARRETT: And we're on the doorstep of that now. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. GARRETT: Because at a meeting in Idaho Falls 
23 between all of the principals of this matter, which were the 
2 4 people from plaintiffs, including Mr, Nelson; people from DMP, 
25 which was the contractor with BJC — 
~7
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1 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
2 MR. GARRETT: — and then the people from Diversified 
3 Control, to sit down and figure out what they were going to do 
4 about this thing, because time was short. Probably Bechtel had 
5 money riding on a contract late, or — 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
7 MR. GARRETT: — (inaudible) get money. At this 
8 meeting Mr. Nelson brought a new — what we call a "new 
9 generation heater"" with him, which was different, and 
10 differently styled. 
11 THE COURT: The U~vent or whatever it's called. 
12 MR. GARRETT: The U-vent technology, that is correct. 
13 THE COURT: Yes. 
14 MR. GARRETT: And that specifically the testimony is 
15 that at that meeting Mr. Darrell from BJC said that xvIf you can 
16 do this by our date — " and that was an early August date — 
17 "then we will pay you." Now, that is our testimony of that 
18 meeting. 
19 In addition to that — 
20 THE COURT: And you're not suggesting the terms were 
21 dated precisely; the date, yes, but not a price? 
22 MR. GARRETT: Not a price, because this was actually a 
23 research and development project at that time. 
24 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
25 MR. GARRETT: Nobody really knew what it was going to 
1 I costr because the technology had changed so dramatically to 
2 reach this new U-vent, and to reach this 800 degree Celsius 
3 figure. So no, no price was agreed upon at that time; but he 
4 did say, (Inaudible) did say that we would be paid if he could 
5 do this. 
6 In addition to that, Mr. (Inaudible), who was — 
7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
8 MR. GARRETT: — t h e i r r ep re sen t a t i ve of Bechtel, 
9 p r e t e n t i o u s l y and (inaudible) sa id , " I f you do t h i s and get i t 
10 to us t ime ly , 
11 and it meets our specifications, the money truck will back up 
12 to your door." I combine those two and say that had to be at 
13 least an offer. The client did perform. The heaters were 
14 accepted and used successfully — 
15 THE COURT: So if the fault anywhere does fall under 
16 the contract implied in fact — and the contract implied in 
17 I fact can be partly expressed and partly implied, but it' s still 
18 not (inaudible), and meeting of the minds at some level. It 
19 seems incredibly indefinite, but let's just assume that this 
20 is your best actual contract argument. 
21 The evidence — the problem — I mean, this may be for 
22 another day and another argument, because what we do know is 
23 there's already a contract for this product to be developed. 
24 I mean, you've spent very good time saying the specifications 
25 J changed and everything. You say that falls out the window, and 
1 this brand new deal between BJC and Heat Source — 
2 MR. GARRETT: That's correct, 
3 THE COURT: — in 2001? 
4 MR. GARRETT: That's correct. 
5 THE COURT: So to prevail on that, you would have to 
6 show that there was a meeting of the minds, maybe not all terms 
7 precise, but they were implied. I mean, is that the core of 
8 your argument on the contract implied argument? 
9 MR, GARRETT: That's the high points of the argument, 
10 1 your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree, Mr. Garrett, that if 
12 you have a contract at all, a contract theory, you do not have 
13 unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, which is the same thing 
14 when strictly applied? 
15 MR. GARRETT: That is correct. I must explain to the 
16 Court that my purpose in doing that is simply this. That of 
17 course you complete inconsistent causes of action. 
18 THE COURT: Absolutely, and if there's a real question 
19 of whether you have a contract or whether you don't, then I 
20 don't think there's anything wrong with you going forward on 
21 the both, 
22 That kind of leads to my next question, would you 
23 agree with the basic principal? Now what's the impact of 
24 it indisputably being a contract to provide this particular 
25 product from BJC to DM — of course I've got to read these 
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1 initials. Excuse me — BJC to DMP to DCS to Heat source, they 
2 were contracts. They were purchase orders. They were not 
3 directly BJC Heat Source, but contracts existed; and they deal 
4 with the subject matter, even I know you're telling us in your 
5 view the specs changed. Wouldn't that clearly take out the 
6 unjust enrichment at that point? 
7 MR. GARRETT: No, I don't-think so, your Honor, because 
8 I think there is enough evidence, and I think (inaudible) 
9 course, that Bechtel changed its mind as to what the ultimate 
10 parameter of heat of that heater would be. 
11 THE COURT: I'm really struggling with that evidence 
12 included in your Rule 7 noncompliance, but also in the evidence 
13 you show, you did have the 800 degree number in there. At 
14 least the one I saw the Exhibit 4, but we can come back to 
15 that. 
16 Your argument, though, is if there was a change in the 
17 contract, then unjust enrichment could kick in; but if there's 
18 a change in the contract, doesn't that just mean a breach of 
19 the contract and there's contract damages, in some way or the 
20 other? 
21 MR. GARRETT: Then with the breach of contract it would 
22 be contract damages. I think the damages would be the same 
23 unjust enrichment. 
24 THE COURT: No, because on the true unjust enrichment, 
25 the only damage that is the value of the benefits concurred on 
- 1 1 -
1 the party receiving the benefit, and among other things, you 
2 pled consequential damages in fairly significant sums; and that 
3 is not a benefit concurred on the recipient of the benefit. 
4 You would actually get the lesser damage under unjust 
5 enrichment or else he probably would have shot at consequential 
6 — under a straight contract theory. If you indicated 
7 somewhere else, if you have a contract under breach of the 
8 implied covenant, that may get you the consequential* Unjust 
9 enrichment won't get you there. Do you disagree with me 
10 on the measure of damages for unjust enrichment? 
11 MR. GARRETT: Well, let's say I don't disagree, but I 
12 would like to be better advised on the matter, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: You want to be what? 
14 MR. GARRET: I would like to be better researched on 
15 the matter, your Honor, but I don't understand that — 
16 THE COURT: Unjust enrichment, which is (inaudible) 
17 contract theory at all, it's more a remedy, is only to avoid 
18 someone receiving a benefit under circumstances in which it 
19 would be unfair to receive that benefit, and they're aware they 
20 get it. The damage is — 
21 the measure of damage is the value of benefit to the party 
22 receiving it; and that's all it is. 
23 MR. GARRETT: (Inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: And I think that that makes sense under 
25 j the equitable theory. So probably of all your theories, 
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1 (inaudible) for a moment. That's your worst case for damages, 
2 your best case if you don't have a contract. Your best case 
3 for a contract would be a (inaudible) I know you had a contract 
4 with DCS. That's something I guess you worked out. You had a 
5 contract and they paid you; and your position is that when they 
6 — the heat element failed under 700 degrees,, then it really 
7 (inaudible)? 
8 MR. GARRETT: No deal. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, I understand that; and I'm interested 
10 in hearing the other side more. I'm not following the typical 
11 format here, because you both briefed it so much; I'm scared to 
12 death you're going to tell me everything in your briefing here, 
13 and I don't want you to. 
14 MR. GARRETT: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: I want to get like you're doing (inaudible) 
16 in the case, and I appreciate it. So I want you to tell me on 
17 the fraud claim — it seems to me you've got big problems on 
18 that. Let me — two reasons- One, your own people say 
19 that whatever was said (inaudible) or you'll be taken care 
20 of, your own testimony of Mr. Nelson seems to be, "I think he 
21 believed it when he said it. I think he meant it." Well, a 
22 present — it has to be a misstatement of a presently existing 
23 material fact. 
24 A presently existing material fact is not normally a 
25 promise of a duty to perform, but it can be the state of mind 
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1 I of the one making a statement. The statement of mind of — 
2 we've spoken (inaudible) — 
3 MR. GARRETT: Darrrell. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you — of that person appears to have 
5 believed him, but the only testimony that's before the Court, 
6 he meant it. 
7 If he meant it then, and he didn't mean it 15 minutes 
8 later, it still wasn't a misrepresentation of a presently 
9 existing materially fact, if the mere fact of nonpayment 
10 doesn't get you there. If he didn't intend it when he said it, 
11 you could go to fraud and the inducement; but I don't think 
12 that you really allege any facts that support that, 
13 The other problem with the fraud argument seems to be 
14 reasonable detriment or reliance, because you'd already started 
15 doing this U-vent process before you ever talked, according to 
16 the evidence I've read, to me they're the two clear flaws of 
17 the things you have to prove by clear and convincing evidence, 
18 Am I missing something in the area of facts or the theory that 
19 we should address before we have a chance to deal with it? 
20 MR. GARRETT; Well, they claim that we'd started on 
21 this project, your Honor, immediately after they failed. 
22 THE COURT: That's May of 2001, right? 
23 MR. GARRETT: Our claim is that we didn't really 
24 do anything about that until Mr. Nelson met with the Bechtel 
25 engineer, Mr. Hilton from Idaho Falls, earlier than the 27th 
-14-
1 meeting. At that meeting Mr, Hilton suggested to Danny Nelson 
2 that he continue to research on this whole U-vent technology 
3 at that time. That's vastly different than me going out and 
4 working on these things before. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. GARRETT: That's our evidence in that regard. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. So in terms of your reliance, you 
8 don't think that — you think there was reliance? You think 
9 there's some evidence (inaudible) reliance. 
10 Help me out on the misrepresentation of a presently 
11 existing material fact. What fact was misrepresented at that 
12 time? 
13 MR. GARRETT: Well, we assume, your Honor,- we're direct 
14 in saying that he said, "We will pay you." There's evidence 
15 in the record and in the compellation that says that he did 
16 not have authority to make that statement, or to amend this 
17 contract. So we can't have (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: But that would go to a breach argument in 
19 the future, if that's all that you had. You're saying that he 
20 deliberately stated something that wasn't true; and yet frankly 
21 I think your witness deserves compliments for being candid in 
22 his deposition. He said, "I think he meant it when he said 
23 it." If that's the case, what's the impact of that? 
24 MR. GARRETT: Well, the impact of that, your Elonor, 
25 is that if he said it — I didn't say he did, but that was a 
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1 misrepresentation of fact because he was not authorized to make 
2 it. My client believed — 
3 THE COURT: But now under the law, as far as what was 
4 said, a presently existing material fact, as is the state of 
5 mind of the one offering the statement, it can only be what he 
6 believed, and if he believed it. Do you have evidence that he 
7 didn't believe it? That one, he didn't have authority; and 
8 two, he knew he didn't have authority? 
9 MR. GARRETT: Oh, yeah. 
10 THE COURT: Well, your only statement — your only 
11 evidence in the record it is that we think he meant it. I need 
12 to have evidence on this (inaudible) . 
13 MR. GARRETT: Well, there's an affidavit on (Inaudible) 
14 in the file-
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. GARRETT: I don't know whether I brought those or 
17 not. 
18 THE COURT: Probably in here. Everything else is. 
19 Which one is that? Do you know if that is in the binder, 
20 Counsel? 
21 MR. GARRETT: It's in a reply memorandum, your Honor, 
22 that was filed when we were dealing with the issue of 
23 jurisdiction. 
24 THE COURT: Of the old one? 
25 MR. GARRETT: Basically. 
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1 THE COURT: Way back is right, yeah. 
2 MR. GARRETT: And he said he didn't have authority to 
3 do it, to make it. 
4 THE COURT: But that doesn't -~ but even if that's 
5 true, there has to be a belief that — he had to have said 
6 it. He'd have to believe he didn't — this person making the 
7 statement had to believe — had the state of mind at that time 
8 that he was not going to follow through. 
9 You can, for example, not have authority at that time, 
10 but believe you can get it, and that the payment would be made; 
11 but then what's the misrepresentation of statement of mind? 
12 It's a statement of intention, because all you've got is the 
13 statement, "I'll pay you," and they don't pay you. That's a 
14 breach of contract. It's not fraud. 
15 MR. GARRETT: I agree. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. GARRETT: The question relates to this business of 
18 authority remarks made. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, being that alone, if the person 
20 lacks authority, but still believes they could either get 
21 authority or the person would get paid, that still doesn't 
22 make it a misrepresentation of a presently existing material 
23 fact, as I understand the law. That's — you think — I think 
24 that's your argument. You think about it. 
25 MR. GARRETT: I think it goes a little further than 
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1 that. I think that it's more on fraud. I think if a person 
2 made a statement that's material to the issue between these 
3 people, knowing, and he had the knowledge and then had 
4 authority, that must be obvious from what he says in his 
5 affidavit-
6 THE COURT: That's not negligent misrepresentation of 
7 anything; and I, you know, I haven't focused in the pleading of 
8 fraud (inaudible) plead more specifically, but I'm going to try 
9 to understand your position now; and I think we're doing that. 
10 MR. GARRETT: I don't believe I can carry it any 
11 further, your Honor. I've said just about everything I can say 
12 about that subject. 
13 THE COURT: I'm certainly not going to make it be your 
14 last word, though. I just wanted to get to the core of the 
15 issues and then hear from the other side and then let you 
16 develop it also. I mean, this has been going on three years. 
17 It's developed in some very interesting ways, and it's not a 
18 simple one to get one's arm's around. I do think it's true 
19 that in your treatment of the statements of material facts, 
20 some you have left simply being admitted. One, for example, 
21 is the specs may have changed. I know you think they're hid. 
22 MR. GARRETT: I do. 
23 THE COURT: But where is your — I don't think you even 
24 rebut it under the rules, but let's set aside the rule for a 
25 minute. Is your evidence solely that e-mail? 
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1 MR. GARRETT: Ifm sorry? 
2 THE COURT: Is your only evidence as to the change and 
3 specification of the heat the e-mail, or is it something else? 
4 MR. GARRETT: No, your Honor. There are other factors 
5 in this. One of the men who was with DCS, who actually thought 
6 (inaudible), his name was Weeks. He said that this thing 
7 started out between they and (inaudible) they and DMB. The 
8 heat parameter is 650 degrees Celsius. Then it changed to 800, 
9 I and he also was advised — 
10 THE COURT: And who says that? Weeks; but who is he? 
11 MR. GARRETT: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Now, in '98 they were talking different 
13 temperatures, but that's not when the contract was done. 
14 MR. GARRETT: Well, the contract was left to these 
15 people in 2000, 
16 THE COURT: Right, and you do — and you see the 
17 documents, the document from 1998. I don't see the relevance 
18 of that document. Then I have the e-mail. I think Exhibit 4 
19 is one of them, but it refers to '650 and it refers to 800 in 
20 the molten sulphur( whatever it is. 
21 MR. GARRETT: That's true. 
22 THE COURT: But is that your evidence of a change in 
23 spec? 
24 MR, GARRETT: No, your Honor. The change in spec went 
25 from 650. Then Weeks told Andy this was the top parameter of 
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1 the heat probe — or the heater of the heat probe; and when it 
2 failed slightly over that temperature; that that's when it went 
3 to 800. 
4 THE COURT: I heard it wrong, I understood it failed 
5 somewhere over 700. Who do you say told Heat Source that 650 
6 was good enough? DCS? That's my initial. 
7 MR. GARRETT: DCS paid for that. 
8 THE COURT: Well, yeah, but you claim that BJS made the 
9 change. That's what I need to understand. 
10 MR. GARRETT: Well, they're talking about the testimony 
11 of Weeks now, your Honor. I'll have to get it out. 
12 THE COURT: Which one; who does Weeks work for? That's 
13 what I'm trying to — 
14 MR. GARRETT: He works for Control — 
15 MR. SWENSON: DCS. 
16 MR. GARRETT: Diversified Control Systems. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, but is he claiming that BJS changed? 
18 Why don't you pull that out for a minute. It will take a 
19 second to get to it. I hate to tell you this, but you're all 
20 I've got left this afternoon. We'll take what it takes. 
21 MR, GARRETT: Your Honor, this is a sheet from the 
22 deposition of Weeks that was taken January 31, 2005. 
23 THE COURT: Of Weeks? 
24 MR. GARRETT: Of Weeks, John Weeks. This examination I 
25 believe is entirely by Mr. Benard. 
-20-
1 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
2 MR. GARRETT: And we start with this question. 
3 Q. Before going into that meeting was it 
4 your understanding from the specifications that 
5 I you needed an 800 degree Celsius heat probe? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 J Q. Was your understanding ever otherwise 
8 I that you could use a heat probe that didn't reach 
9 I 800 degrees Celsius? 
10 I A. Originally we were going to test to 
11 650f because it didn't want to take to 800; but 
12 I they were going to use it at 800. Then they felt 
13 that they couldn't. It was engineered at 800. 
14 If it still testing back at the 650, then that 
15 would be okay. 
16 THE COURT: And was that testimony ever explored 
17 further to see when originally met, and what the spec was 
18 I versus what might have been okay? 
19 MR. GARRETT: Well, the only thing that it had to do 
20 with that to be filled out, your Honor, I don't know that it is 
21 completely, or if this is just part of the deposition. There 
22 was the meeting held on the 27th of June, where all these people 
23 got together. 
24 THE COURT: Of 2001? 
25 MR. GARRETT: Of 2001. 
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THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to interrupt you for just 
a minute, Mr. Garrett. I have a gentleman here who I have been 
holding his wedding certificate for weeks
 r and we ne&d to make 
him legitimate. I need to just take him back and give him 
(inaudible). I'll be about three or four minutes. So why 
don't you look at your document there, and just take a short 
break. 
(Recess taken) 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you find any more on that 
testimony on Weeks (inaudible) that helps me know whether it 
goes to formal specs or what time period? 
MR. GARRETT: Well, it was the 27th meeting, your Honor. 
Later on on this page — 
THE COURT: Yeah, but that's where he — that's when he 
said they were talking about that. So my problem — I'm trying 
to understand what the hard evidence is, that BJC ever changed 
their specs from 800, because Mr. Benard says that they didn't, 
and I'm trying to find evidence that says that they did. 
MR. GARRETT: Well, there's testimony from Weeks that 
says they did. 
THE COURT: But when? 
MR. GARRETT: Well — 
THE COURT: As part of their deal, or just something as 
we work with it through the '90Ts? To let you know, we go back 
to at least the late N90Ts when (inaudible). 
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1 MR. GARRETT: This came as a surprise to me, this 
2 particular bit of testimony, because they've always maintained 
3 they never exchanged the specs. 
4 THE COQRT: Uh-huh. 
5 MR. GARRETT: And here is Weeks, who's working on this 
6 thing, that says, "Originally they were going to set to 650." 
7 It says, "They." That's got to mean Bechtel. 
8 THE C00RT: That's why — that is originally where it's 
9 really peaking my interest; and I don't know, maybe that's all 
10 you've got. I — what I'm trying to understand — 
11 MR. GARRETT: Well, this spec ~ I don't believe that 
12 DCS even had the spec until that summer of 2000, because that's 
13 when the contract was left. I don't believe that subcontract 
14 was in its — 
15 THE COURT: But that doesn't mean they weren't talking 
16 about the needs before that. So let's say they have a spec in 
17 2000. Do you — maybe you've heard. Do you have evidence of 
18 what the spec was in 2000, when the contract — did you ever 
19 J see a contract between the BJC and the government? 
20 MR. GARRETT: I'm sorry, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT; Have you ever seen the original contract? 
22 MR. GARRETT: I believe I have in discovery, your 
23 Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Does it give the spec specifically? 
25 MR. GARRETT: Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: It does? 
2 MR. GARRETT: But my client never saw it. 
3 THE COURT: I know, but your argument is that the spec 
4 changed. If your client didn't see it, and your client would 
5 clarify that, I still have trouble in seeing why that's not 
6 between DCS and your client, rather your client and BJC. 
7 That's part of my confusion. 
8 MR. GARRETT: Well, I don't sense — I sense the 
9 confusion, but I don't believe it should be confusing-
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. GARRETT: Because if they issue an 800 degree 
12 Celsius spec for the heater, then there is testimony in these 
13 I documents that you have before you, that they didn't use it, 
14 when there were initial contacts with DBM and DCS. They went 
15 just as Weeks says originally; we were going to test to 650, 
16 because they didn't want to take it up to 800; but they were 
17 going to use it at 800. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. GARRETT: They felt if they could, if it was 
20 engineered at 800, and they could still test and pass at 650, 
21 then it would be okay. That is the figure that they gave 
22 Nelson to design and build that heater to that temperature. 
23 Now, Nelson never received that spec, never saw it. Briefly 
24 he may have seen it on that 27th meeting, but not to analyze it, 
25 or go into; but at that meeting he knew now they wanted an 800 
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1 degree — 
2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
3 MR. GARRETT: — heater. One of the documents I 
4 put in here from DPM is in June of 2001 they changed their 
5 requirement to exactly 800. 
6 THE COURT: If that would change, it keeps troubling 
7 you, but I understand how you — what you believe the evidence 
8 would be to support that; and certainly as between DCS and Heat 
9 Source. That would certainly be a jury question. 
10 MR. GARRETT: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: The question is whether (inaudible) DMP? 
12 I'm not going to stop you from having any additional argument 
13 you want. I think I understand the basic parameters entirely, 
14 but I wanted to understand where you were; and it's been 
15 helpful to understand it. I would prefer now to go to the 
16 moving party and then give you another chance, if that's okay. 
17 MR. GARRETT: Thank you, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Benard. 
19 MR. BENARD: Yes, and maybe I'll just address it on 
20 what's most recent. 
21 THE COURT: Any approach you'd like to take (inaudible) 
22 wherever you like to do it is fine by me. 
23 j MR. BENARD: I think some of the confusion comes in 
24 this discussion, verbal discussion between DCS and Heat Source, 
25 and the BJC written specifications. 
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1 MR. BENARD: Yes, that's right; and he — and he 
2 testified that he did see the specs throughout the process. 
3 Even the testimony of Mr. Weeks indicates that the ultimate 
4 requirement was 800. Whether you're going to originally test 
5 at 650, it had to perform at 800, which is in the spec. The 
6 spec never changed. 
7 THE COURT: Well, if I understand it, I mean, they 
8 could — BJC could do a spec of 800, hold it forever, and 
9 choose to never run it to 800. If that's their spec, that's 
10 their spec. 
11 MR. BENARD: Exactly. 
12 THE COURT: In fact, it failed before 800 the first 
13 time around. 
14 MR. BENARD: And BJC didn't go back and say, MOh, 800 
15 is what it says, but it doesn'z really say that." If that were 
16 the case, then I think there might be a fraud claim; but that's 
17 not the case. They stay at 800, they always wanted 800, and 
18 that's what was required. 
19 THE COURT: That might be used as a fraud claim? 
20 MR. BENARD: It would be — 
21 THE COURT: Well, I'm not even sure it goes to fraud, 
22 but it could go to a new contract implied in fact more than 
23 fraud. 
24 MR. BENARD: There you go. I guess — 
25 THE COURT: If the speck changed, they said, "Let's do 
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1 a deal (inaudible) some 650 or 800, give me one that gives 
2 me 800," I think you could have a classic implied in fact 
3 contract. 
4 MR. BENARD: Although none of that happened either. 
5 THE COORT: Well, then that's your position. 
6 MR. BENARD: That's my position; and in fact, there was 
7 no discussion, even in the comments that "back the truck up or 
8 take care of you," there's no discussion of change required 
9 from 800 to anything less than 800. 
10 THE COURT: The (inaudible) discussion as it's set 
11 forth and as admitted under the Rule 7 would appear to be, A'Get 
12 us to our specs," 
13 MR. BENARD: That's right. That's right. 
14 THE COURT: That doesn't mean that Mr. Nelson didn't 
15 actually think it was to an 800. I don't know as to why he 
16 might think that, but he might not think that based on who 
17 knows what, but would that change anything if he did? 
18 MR. BENARD: Not with respect to BJC. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, 
20 MR. BENARD: Because if BJC did nothing to even 
21 insinuate that it might have a different expectation or 
22 requirement. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. BENARD: With respect to the detrimental reliance, 
25 I think it is critical that the facts show that Mr. Nelson 
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began work on this new technology, new style a month and a half 
before any purported comments from Bechtel Jacobs. In fact, he 
even admits — 
THE COURT: Let's assume he worked on them, and I think 
the evidence says he did. Can it be detrimental reliance if he 
does any more work thereafter in reliance, any more — I mean, 
more than nominal? 
MR. BENARD: I don't think that that's the case here. 
I think — 
THE COURT: Well, I'm asking, give me the legal 
authority. 
MR. BENARD: The legal — 
THE COURT: Then you can tell me what the facts are. 
MR. BENARD: The legal requirement is that there must 
be inducement that must negatively affect the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff here began that work without a promise, and he admits 
in his testimony no promise — 
THE COURT: To begin, but what if his position was — 
I'm being a little hypothetical now, I know. I'm sorry, it's 
not the best thing — he started work, he has the meeting, and 
no one made him feel like he was going to get paid. The trucks 
weren't going to be backed up. The doors were welded shut on 
the truck, okay? So he said, "No more work," but if they say 
the doors were open, he works, if those facts are there. Does 
that get us to detrimental reliance sufficient, even though 
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1 he'd done a bunch before? 
2 MR. BENARD: I don't think it does, your Honor, because 
3 he's undertaken the work, and he's moving forward on it, and 
4 there's no specific promise that if you do this U-vent — the 
5 Bechtal Jacobs folks had never heard of or seen the U-vent 
6 technology until he shows up with a prototype. 
7 So clearly he had undertaken a huge portion of this 
8 work, prior to that meeting. Really we can't lose sight again 
9 that the reason he was doing that is he was bound through his 
10 subcontracts to get that done. That (inaudible) detrimental 
11 reliance. It's clear that he began it before, and admits that 
12 he didn't have a promise for any sort of payment when he 
13 undertook that work. 
14 THE COQRT: What if he does claim he had — going back 
15 to contract implied and not fraud? I'm — frankly, the fraud 
16 is a very weak claim; and I would like you to address the issue 
17 of the presently existing material fact, but we'll come back to 
18 that in a second, and I would like you to do that. 
19 I think the ones that might be a tougher one to say 
20 there is no facts to support is the contract implied in fact. 
21 The biggest problem with the contract implied with fact is it's 
22 not pled. 
23 MR. BENARD: Yeah, exactly; and I think maybe — you 
24 alluded to something that maybe that's an argument for another 
25 day. 
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1 THE COORT: Uh-huh. 
2 I MR. BENARD: Because clearly there are problems with 
3 mutual assent. Clearly there are problems with whether 
4 this is a definite contract or not. In fact, I believe the 
5 testimony shows that additional facts, or additional terms kept 
6 coming into this, even without Bechtei Jacobs participating in 
7 this. 
8 I There's some discussion in which we can get into in 
9 which Nelson was saying, well — and that they all agreed to 
10 pay me within 60 days. So there were some time frames here, 
11 and yet that never came from a Bechtei Jacobs individual. 
12 So I think we — I really believe that's an issue for a 
13 separate day, where the contract really isn't there. 
14 THE COURT: Separate day (inaudible) here or in another 
15 lawsuit? It's not the answer you want — 
16 MR, BENARD: Either proposed amendment or — 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MR. BENARD: — something. 
19 THE COURT: It's certainly not appropriate now where 
20 the claims that we've been dealing with for three years were 
21 quantum Meruit. 
22 THE COURT: Well, you heard very earlier I said, and 
23 even I noted — liberal notice (inaudible) I really can't see 
24 — certainly not in the causes of action I cannot see a 
25 contract implied in fact. Mr. Garrett said, "Well, it's in 
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1 the facts." It may be in the facts; but (inaudible) cause of 
2 action. 
3 MR. BENARD: And that again, I think once that's done, 
4 then maybe we can address it, 
5 THE COURT: And one of your arguments is it's too late 
6 to do it, but let's wait for a moment on that. 
7 MR. BENARD: Let's wait for another day on that, 
8 because I think he deserves the right to plead it and 
9 contradict to and oppose my suggestion to the quantum Meruit. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, back to the presently existing 
11 material facts argument. 
12 MR. BENARD: I think it's clear from the evidence, 
13 from Mr. Nelson himself, that he believes the Bechtel Jacobs 
14 folks believed what they were saying. That they were going 
15 to take care of them. One critical distinction between what 
16 Mr. Garrett has said the statement was. No one has alleged in 
17 the evidence a statement that Bechtel Jacobs or anyone said, 
18 "We will pay you — " using the word "pay." The statement is, 
19 "They would be taken care of." 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MR. BENARD: I think that that's a critical distinction 
22 certainly with respect to fraud. Bechtel Jacobs person believes 
23 that they were going to be taken care of is Bechtel Jacobs paid 
24 $700,000 on this project. 
25 Now, later, after the fact, Mr. Nelson spoke with 
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1 Mr. Deerholt, and Mr. Deerholt said, you know, "You did good 
2 work. You should have been paid. Not by us/7 I think that 
3 that solidifies the fact that Mr. Deerholt, when he says, 
4 ^You'll be taken care of," and Mr. Zalza, he made that 
5 statement about backing the truck up with money. 
6 J Well, those things actually occurred. A lot of money 
7 was paid. Bechtel Jacobs took care of its responsibilities 
8 under the contract; and the language there, there was no 
9 misrepresentation. In fact, in the opposition, and I think 
10 it's important to note, and I'll quote, because it's important, 
11 "It may therefore be inferred that BJC did intend to pay." 
12 THE COURT: Yeah, what did you think, both from 
13 testimony and argument (inaudible) intent to pay, and — I 
14 mean, if that intent was uhere at the time the decision was 
15 made, I don't think what happened later changes it or makes 
16 it fraud. It makes a breach, maybe, if you can make out a 
17 contract. 
18 MR. BENARD: If that's a contract? 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 
20 MR. BENARD: That's right. So I think, your Honor, 
21 that the fraud claim is certainly not clear and convincing 
22 I standards, and it should be — summary judgment should be 
23 granted on the fraud claim. 
24 THE COURT: Well, and I think you need to say more when 
25 we get back from Mr. Garrett. See if he can add more, but I do 
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1 think it's clearly the weakest link for the reasons stated. 
2 MR. BENARD: Let me get back, then. I think you're 
3 right when you came out and you said this really isn't — 
4 despite all of the briefing and all of the issues and the 
5 twists and turns, it really boils down to a contract between 
6 Bechtel Jacobs and DMP and subcontracts down the line to the 
7 plaintiffs. 
8 The case law is clear that the plaintiff doesn't have 
9 to be part of the express contract covering that for unjust 
10 enrichment and quantum Meruit claims to be barred. 
11 THE COURT: It just has to cover the subject matter. 
12 MR. BENARD: Subjecr matter; and there's no dispute — 
13 THE COURT: It's ironic, though, isn't it? I mean, 
14 because if both claims could go forward, and the contract 
15 claims failed with unjust enrichment, wouldn't you have less 
16 exposure? 
17 MR. BENARD: We would. I think you're right on the 
18 consequential damages. You can't get to those under an unjust 
19 enrichment or a quantum Meruit version of the facts, because 
20 you're just getting the benefit of what was conferred. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. 
22 MR. BENARD: Not any other breached damages. 
23 THE COURT: That's (inaudible) make it to the party 
24 receiving it, not even (inaudible) hear it. 
25 MR. BENARD: Right, right. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
2 MR. BENARD: I think on the claims that are before the 
3 Court, the express contract between Bechtel Jacobs and DMP for 
4 the precise heaters at issue, there's no dispute that the 
5 purchase order between DCS and Heat Source never changed. 
6 The style and the technology used for those five zone heaters 
7 I may have changed, and did change (inaudible), but the contents, 
8 the subject matter of that purchase order between DCS and Heat 
9 Source was part and parcel of the contract between Bechtel 
10 Jacobs and DMP. Because of that, the claims that are right 
11 before the Court now are barred. There's no quantum Meruit 
12 claim, no unjust enrichment claim that can be brought against 
13 Bechtel Jacobs; and without an express contract between 
14 plaintiff and Bechtel Jacobs, there can be no covenant claim. 
15 THE COURT: Can't there be a covenant claim, an implied 
16 in fact contract? The implied covenant kicks in any time you 
17 have a contractual relationship, not — is not to be implied in 
18 law, which is not really contract, but in implied fact. Do you 
19 agree it can exist in implied fact? 
20 MR. BENARD: It may. I'd like to research that more. 
21 THE COURT: Well, it's not (inaudible) very often, but 
22 when you think of the underlying purpose, what it really says 
23 is you're going to have a contract, you're going to discharge 
24 the obligations, you're going to meet the covenants, you're 
25 going to live up to (inaudible), all in good faith; and you'll 
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do nothing to deprive the other of (inaudible). 
MR. BENARD: That's right. 
THE COURT; And if there is a contract — I don't mean 
the type that's been (inaudible) — 
MR. BENARD: Right. 
THE COURT: — (inaudible) you call a plumber, you say, 
"Come see my leaky faucet.7' You don't say much else. He fixes 
it, and you expect to pay him. Then unjust enrichment, that's 
a contract, and some (inaudible). 
MR. BENARD: Right. If they were to fix it improperly 
to perhaps prevent the benefit of the bargain — 
THE COURT: Yes, or if he were to do something that 
made it impossible for the plumber to do the job. 
MR. BENARD: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think — 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) I guess I'm going to respond to 
your statement that without an expressed contract, it may not 
be the implied covenant. It cannot be the implied contract, 
but I think it can be a written contract, an oral contract, or 
a contract implied in fact. 
MR. BENARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's my thinking on it. 
MR. BENARD: And that may be the case. I think 
conceptually that that seems right. We haven't briefed it. 
THE COURT: If that's true, we don't have a written 
contract, right, Mr. Benard? We don't have a contract — an 
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1 oral contract that's clear enough in its terms to meet a 
2 contract to meet a contract between BJC and Heat Source under 
3 the cases including Gold's Gym and (inaudible). It isn't even 
4 there. The terms aren't there. Particularly price. The 
5 question I'm struggling with, is there potentially a contract 
6 implied in fact? I think potentially there is. I don't think 
7 it's well pled, and then it's a question of whether (inaudible) 
8 meant to plead that contract. 
9 MR, BENARD: Right. 
10 THE COURT: If he completed that, then he may hang on 
11 for the time being (inaudible) good faith and fair dealing, but 
12 without one of those contracts, though, he doesn't get the key 
13 back. 
14 MR. BENARD: Right. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. What's your argument on where 
16 he stands? Because if he still can amend to clarify that 
17 (inaudible) covenant implied in fact, I probably shouldn't be 
18 dismissing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
19 (inaudible), 
20 MR. BENARD: Actually, your Honor, I think you should. 
21 THE COURT: Tell me why. 
22 MR. BENARD: So that he would complete it properly with 
23 an implied contract. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I think he could do that. It's not 
25 that you wouldn't (inaudible). 
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1 j MR. BENARD: Yeah. I think you could dismiss that one 
2 I without prejudice. 
3 THE COURT: I see what you mean. 
4 MR. BENARD: On that particular — 
5 I THE COURT: I think it is cleaner that he have to pay 
6 from the beginning of what he has. 
7 MR. BENARD: Right. 
8 THE COURT: But then we get into the — this one really 
9 has played with my head. 
10 MR. BENARD: Oursr too. 
11 THE COURT: Because if I say he has a covenant implied 
12 in fact theory at least that he could pay in good faith. That 
13 would let him also plead the entire covenant of good faith and 
14 fair dealing. Couldn't — well — 
15 MR. BENARD: I don't know if he asked that. 
16 THE COURT: (Inaudible) even if that fails, the other 
17 contracts throw it out. 
18 MR. BENARD: It's still there, but that other contract 
19 still covers the scope of this (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: That's right. I was trying to decide if 
21 the (inaudible),, but it doesn't. 
22 MR. BENARD: No. Not under any circumstances. 
23 THE COURT: Yes. I think — 
24 MR. BENARD: Because it's clearly ~ 
25 THE COURT: — in all candor, the best case (inaudible) 
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1 today is a chance to amend to clearly state covenant implied in 
2 fact, and a related implied covenant of good faith and fair 
3 I dealing, and fraud, and unjust enrichment (inaudible). 
4 MR. BENARD: Correct. 
5 THE COURT: That's the best case. If you want to argue 
6 the worst case? 
7 MR. BENARD: You know, I would, your Honor. First to 
8 the covenant side of it — 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR, BENARD: — there has been no evidence presented to 
11 the Court. BJC has acted not in good faith. That they, first 
12 of all — and it should be noted that plaintiff never once made 
13 a direct request for payment to Bechtei Jacobs. The only time 
14 that — 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, (inaudible). 
16 MR. BENARD: It goes through DMP up through the stream. 
17 Clearly shows again how the contract worked in this case. No 
18 request has been — or Heat Source never made a statement to 
19 the effect of, "If we do this extra work, we expect to be paid 
20 more money." That's also in the evidence. You look at what 
21 Bechtei Jacobs did, it received the REA, it considered it, had 
22 a board meeting, and came down on the basis that our spec never 
23 changed. 
24 So they rejected it all the DMP witness said, "You 
25 know what? That was within their right to do." That they 
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1 acted on it, they looked at it. There's nothing the plaintiffs 
2 can say that Bechtel Jacobs just dismissed it out of hand, 
3 didn't consider the request for equitable adjustment. 
4 THE COURT: I think the way it plays now, it would have 
5 to go to some cavalier treatment of (inaudible), an arbitrary, 
6 capricious rejection or lack of consideration. 
7 MR. BENARD: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Because I think within it, if there is a 
9 contract, and an REA (inaudible) an obligation and consider it 
10 in good faith; but you said that's no evidence, they did not do 
11 that, 
12 MR. BENARD: Right. 
13 THE COURT: (Inaudible) they rejected it. 
14 MR. BENARD: Right, and I actually the evidence shows 
15 that they treated it and considered it and had it valid basis 
16 for denial, because the specs never changed. That's a valid 
17 basis. It comports with all of the evidence. The spec never 
18 changed BJC did nothing wrong. 
19 That's what happens sometimes in business. People bid 
20 big jobs. They have cost of overruns. They don't always get 
21 paid. If the contracting party does nothing wrong, which BJC 
22 didn't, and didn't change its spec, they shouldn't be held 
23 responsible for it. 
24 THE COURT: Well, one question that Mr. Garrett may 
25 care to answer, if he would, is other than the treatment of the 
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1 REA, in what ways is he believed factually? There was a breach 
2 of the entire covenant if ited to a contract implied in fact? 
3 J I will {inaudible) his response on that to be sure, then. 
4 MR. BENARD: Yeah, and my last comment will go towards 
5 the potential implied contract. There's no doubt that the 
6 terms are indefinite. There is no discussions of the quantity, 
7 quality, when, where, how, what, how much. No direction. 
8 This meeting was held to look at where all the parties 
9 were. The contracting parties and the subcontracting parties, 
10 to see where they were on performing the work that was the 
11 basis and the subject of the underlying contract between 
12 Bechtel Jacobs and DMP. That meeting covered that contract. 
13 That meeting covered that contract. It was not 
14 that there to set up a new contract, a new implied contract; 
15 and statements that we'll be taking care of. That's too 
16 indefinite. By taking care of him by backing the money truck 
17 up to his door, okay, Bechtel Jacobs did that. They spent a 
18 lot of money to do this. 
19 It's also worth noting that the plaintiff's testimony 
20 focuses in on both BJC, Mr. Deerholt, and Mr. — from DMP. My 
21 mind is drawing a blank. 
22 THE COURT: I understand. 
23 MR. BENARD: Herb Pollard — thank you. Herb Pollard, 
24 okay? It fluctuates back and forth. "Oh, well, Herb told me 
25 it would be taken care of.'7 u0h, well, Deerholt told me it 
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1 will be taken care of." M0h, Herb told me it will be taken 
2 care of," okay? If that sort of statement can be the contract, 
3 anything can be a contract at that point. That's not definite 
4 enough. 
5 THE COURT: Well, it does make me wonder about the 
6 impact of a fairly recent line of cases on failure for 
7 indefiniteness. In each of those cases, the Supreme Court 
8 primarily found they failed for indefiniteness; and it didn't 
9 let them go fall back on an implied in fact, (Inaudible), but 
10 I'm not sure that (inaudible) of this either. 
11 MR. BENARD: Right, I just don't see — 
12 THE COURT: Well, frankly, I think you even had an 
13 implied in fact (inaudible) to deal with until the tail end of 
14 the briefing. 
15 MR. BENARD: I agree, and that's part of why we're in 
16 this situation trying to deal with partially an unknown, but I 
17 think that's a lot, as well; three years into the case, and now 
18 something that's fabricated — not fabricated — created a new 
19 theory, based on facts that haven't been there in the past. 
20 THE COURT: Maybe it evolved. No, I'm not thinking of 
21 — I'm not pushing the theory of evolution. Maybe it did 
22 evolve. I mean, it certainly — as I say, it's not there in a 
23 way that I can read it as a fact. You've lived with the case. 
24 Although you've been through discovery, you may have seen signs 
25 of evolution earlier than I did, but I didn't see it. 
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1 MR. BENARD: Yeah, and I don't think — 
2 THE COURT; Mr. Garrett (inaudible) late in the plea. 
3 MR. BENARD: Yeah, and to be honest, it's not there; 
4 and these statements are insufficient to create a contract, 
5 whether implied or expressed. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, 
7 MR. BENARD: And I'll sit down now. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. 
9 MR. BENARD: Unless there's anything else? 
10 THE COURT: No, I appreciate the argument so far. 
11 Mr. Swenson, what are you going to add? Obviously you 
12 have a different position about that. 
13 MR. SWENSON: Not that different. We have a couple of 
14 differences. The first one in the contract claim, it actually 
15 was pled against us, but it's still the claim in the implied in 
16 I fact contract. I think the most important thing about that -— 
17 THE COURT: But you're still a step removed, right? 
18 MR. SWENSON: Well, I think so, and that's what I was 
19 going to say. 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible), okay. 
21 MR. SWENSON: If you go to the testimony of Mr. Nelson, 
22 he was asked why he didn't file the claim against DMP, and he« 
23 said, "We were instructed to do specific work by Bechtel Jacobs 
24 employees, and told that we would be compensated for that. 
25 Then interfaced directly with the Bechtel Jacobs employees to 
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1 deliver those products. So we did feel that DMP or DCS 
2 was bound in that transaction, because the instructions came 
3 directly from Bechtel Jacobs." 
4 That is Exhibit 4. That's Mr. Nelson's testimony. 
5 So even though they get by the pleading hurdle in the case, 
6 they don't get by the factual and the summary judgment hurdle. 
7 I They have presented no evidence that there was in fact a 
8 conduct implied in fact dealing with DMP. 
9 I think that goes to their second claim, too, which is 
10 I the implied covenant. The only thing I would add on that is we 
11 did cite a case, Smith vs. Grand Canyon Expeditions. It said, 
12 "The reach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
13 dealing extends no further than the purposes and express terms 
14 of the contract." 
15 Again, where we get into the indefinites, that also 
16 applies to this. 
17 THE COURT: So in express terms, that could make it a 
18 little harder to get there to implied in fact. 
19 MR. SWENSON: I think so, and that's a 2003 Supreme 
20 Court case. 
21 THE COURT: I mean, implied in fact contract according 
22 to (inaudible) can be partly expressed, partly implied in fact, 
23 or they could be wholly implied in fact; but I don't think 
24 there's a wholly expressed with a not implied, obviously. 
25 Forgive that. That was rather badly said, wasn't it? But they 
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1 can be partly expressed. 
2 So to the extent there's a partly expressed component, 
3 I suppose that could give rise to the implied covenant, but 
4 I what would be the express agreement here that would give rise 
5 to it, between he and — 
6 MR. SWENSON: That's exactly what we struggled with. 
7 I In discovery that's why we asked the question, you know, "Why 
8 are you not suing DCS? Why are you not doing this?" and his 
9 response was, "They paid us." Yeah, we're dealing directly 
10 with Dr. Jacobs, not DCS or DMP. 
11 At no time have they presented any other evidence 
12 about any terms of the contract, any agreement we just don't 
13 think there's any contract that exists, implied, express or in 
14 any other manner; and we think that takes care of both of their 
15 first two causes of action. 
16 The third one you've addressed at length, and that's 
17 the unjust enrichment, because it is specifically covered under 
18 a contract with DCS, we don't believe that they're entitled to 
19 any claim in this case. Then we don't have the fraud claim 
20 against us. That makes it a little easier. I think when you 
21 add about the best case and worst case, they're the same here. 
22 I think DMP should be out of this case, at least as far as the 
23 plaintiff's claims go. 
24 THE COURT: When we come down to the appropriately 
25 (inaudible) contract implied in fact, because there are no 
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1 facts? 
2 MR. SWENSON: Exactly, yeah, There are no disputed 
3 issues of material fact; and none have been presented in the 
4 record. Additionally, the fact that we did that for, again, 
5 I were admitted, because of the Rule 7 violation. They were 
6 uncontroverted. 
7 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
8 MR. SWENSON: Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Garrett, let's — if I ma start with 
10 what I think are your toughest problemsr and ask you if you've 
11 got anything you can add on either the fraud, as only to BJS or 
12 to the unjust enrichment claim as applied to either party, 
13 based on the fact that there was a contract that addresses the 
14 subject matter? Then we'll go to the others 
15 that I think are a little more complex. 
16 MR. GARRETT: Well, in dealing with the fraud claim, 
17 your Honor, I think I've set forth all of the facts that I 
18 have, 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. GARRETT: And I would only add, and I believe those 
21 facts do add up to a fraud case in this fashion, I think that 
22 Mr. Deerholt was in a spot. He needed their heater. He had to 
23 timely produce it to get it to work in its mediation process. 
24 Nelson brought to that meeting a prototype of a new heater, 
25 after the first one failed. He said, "Yes, do that. Do that." 
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1 He took it with him back to Tennessee. 
2 In the course of that meeting, he said to Mr. Nelson, 
3 *If you can do this, and it meets our specs, and do it timely, 
4 we'll pay you. We'll take care of you." I think that means 
5 the same thing. I don't see how it could be otherwise. Unless 
6 somebody says, "Well, taken care of you means (inaudible) from 
7 the rope." I don't know. It might be one — 
8 THE COURT: Well, there's one form of taking care of 
9 you. 
10 MR. GARRETT: Yes, but anyhow, essentially he claims 
11 he didn't have authority to make that statement. Now, if he 
12 didn't have that authority, then that is a misrepresentation of 
13 a material fact, because he said he — it would paid. Now, he 
14 is a high level employee in that company. He is the deputy 
15 I director of (inaudible). I don't think he's even with the 
16 company now. He was the deputy director of projects. 
17 That deputy director, your Honor, ought to be able 
18 to make promises to pay. Now, they may have a very strict, 
19 bureaucratic way of getting at this, but none of that is known 
20 to my client. They didn't say, "Well, you go get our rules and 
21 regulations and fill this out, and get 14 copies," and so 
22 forth. 
23 THE COURT: It can go to the fraud claim, if you've got 
24 enough else. It can certainly go to a contract implied in fact 
25 claim; and it can go to an imperative authority claim if you 
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1 believe that it was BJS that invested him with the appearance 
2 of the authority to bind this. So it's overlapping (inaudible) . 
3 MR. GARRETT: Yes, it overlaps. 
4 THE COURT: Yeah, sure. 
5 MR. GARRETT: Of course, that's why I got to the man in 
6 charge of this salt melting project, which is sculptures; and 
7 he repeats that "You will have the money truck back up to your 
8 door," Now, I don't know how you take that, but if I were at 
9 a meeting like that and were to try to solve the problem, if 
10 people told me that, I would think I was going to get paid if I 
11 would do the job. 
12 THE COURT: Would you also — and I'm not trying to be 
13 flippant here — wouldn't you also want to know the size of the 
14 truck? I mean, what's the deal going on here? Is it a little 
15 truck; is it a big truck; am I going to be paid everything? I 
16 mean, it sounds pretty promising. I admit it. 
17 MR. GARRETT: Well, that's usually the issue — 
18 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
19 MR. GARRETT: — is the payment. 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MR, GARRETT: And nobody could know that, your Honor, 
22 until there's actually materials purchased and the first labor 
23 goes into it, they're tested and so forth, mistakes made, 
24 corrected, reworked and gotten to the final produce. So that 
25 price could not be determined at that time, but they certainly 
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1 didn't say, "Now, what are you going to charge us?" They just 
2 said, uDo it, and you'll be paid-" 
3 Now, Counsel says, "Well, they did pay. They paid the 
4 $700,000." They paid that to the companies in Idaho. We got 
5 only a bit of that, somewhere around 50. 
6 THE COURT: Yes. Well that's way down the line, but 
7 didn't you — you got paid what your deal was with DCS, didn't 
8 you? 
9 MR. GARRETT: Correct] 
10 THE COURT: Which is one reason you haven't sued DCS. 
11 MR. GARRETT: That's right, and I don't know that 
12 it's done with discovery here, but I don't think it will be 
13 undisputed. Two of the people said, "Well, he was right on the 
14 line with us. That's why we paid him." Meaning that he did 
15 what he was supposed to. 
16 I That brings us back — well, I don't know whether you 
17 want to get into this or not, but that brings us back to the 
18 differential treatment of heat — parameters of heat here. 
19 That is so important. 
20 J In other words, they said they needed an 800 degree 
21 heater; but your Honor, that specification when it's examined. 
22 It says 800 degrees, but then it works its way down from that. 
23 It's not entirely an 800 degree heater even with specifications 
24 That is made clear by the e-mail we have from Hilton 
25 Engineers — 
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1 THE COURT: And they're the one you mean, but both — 
2 either that e-mail — well, that e-mail I don't believe shows a 
3 change in specification; and I don't think that we can just 
4 skate by that. You haven't under Rule 7 appropriately 
5 controverted the fact that the spec didn/t change. I know 
6 you're a thorough professional. I would suspect you didn't 
7 have good enough evidence to do it. You gave us what you had. 
8 It was the e-mail, but — 
9 MR. GARRETT: Well, the e-mail itself lends credence to 
10 the fact that this was kind of sliding number. First of all, 
11 there's a Delta T in that, which we haven't really gone into 
12 in detail. That's a differential in temperature between the 
13 outside of the sheath and the inside of the sheath. If that is 
14 a certain number, then the total heat can be reduced. 
15 THE COURT: I see what you're saying, but you — if you 
16 are to some degree going to hang your hat on the theory that 
17 the specs changed by BJC. Because the specs changed, the job 
18 changed, because the job changed, your people would be able to 
19 get paid more. You've got to bring forth evidence under Rule 
20 56 of changing the specs; and I'm not seeing that evidence, 
21 certainly not in the form required by the rule. 
22 MR. GARRETT: Well, the — 
23 THE COURT: You're saying there is some indication in 
24 that e-mail, but that's not evidence of a change in the spec. 
25 MR. GARRETT: Well, the testimony of the people from 
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1 DCS, Diversified Control. They say that that spec was not used 
2 in their temperature request-
3 THE COURT: Because it's not used doesn't change the 
4 fact that it's there. 
5 MR. GARRETT: Doesn't change the writing. 
6 THE COURT: Doesn't change the (inaudible). 
7 MR. GARRETT: My client wasn't even aware of this, your 
8 Honor. 
9 THE COURT: I know. That's part of this thing about the 
10 distance. We had the intermediary. It does make a slightly 
11 different deal (inaudible) . The deal — what the deal was, but 
12 certain things were being communicated; but that's hardly a 
13 problem when you don't have this direct relationship with BJS, 
14 unless you can create a (inaudible), create a true — for 
15 example, a contract of implied fact. 
16 MR. GARRETT: I think that's a point that must be 
17 addressed (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: I do, too. 
19 MR, GARRETT: I did allege an oral contract. 
20 THE COURT: Where is that in your briefing (inaudible)9 
21 In your — 
22 MR. GARRETT: Well, maybe not clearly in the complaint, 
23 but I do say that they breached the contract in the complaint. 
24 I don't happen to have a copy of that with me, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Yeah, but the only contract facts you set 
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1 forth, even if I say, "Okay, Mr, Garrett, you did aallege an 
2 oral contract," the evidence is the meeting of 2001. Isn't 
3 that the oral contract? Usually you (inaudible). That sounds 
4 like a classic implied in fact, rather than a fully expressed 
5 contract. If you had an oral contract that had sufficient 
6 terms to show a meeting of the minds, you would be there, but 
7 you're not there; but you fall back (inaudible) implied. 
8 MR. GARRETT: That is true. That may not be clearly 
9 set forth in my complaint, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And I think I'm inclined to give you a 
11 chance to do that, but let's see about more. No. 1, I am 
12 dismissing fraud. I believe you simply do not have evidence 
13 that could be found by any reasonable fact finder to show by 
14 clear and convincing evidence that either the misstatement or 
15 misrepresentation of a presently existing real fact, including 
16 the state of mind of the person making the alleged utterance. 
17 Neither, I believe, you can show detrimental reliance. With 
18 those two pegs or legs gone, you do not have a fraud claim, and 
19 that will be dismissed (inaudible). 
20 I also find that as an existing contract or series of 
21 contracts goes to the subject matter; and they exist, and they 
22 eliminate, in this case, the possibility of unjust enrichment 
23 or quantum meruit. I also find that in terms of your implied 
24 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, you haven't at this 
25 point identified what covenant is being breached, but I'm going 
-52-
1 to give you room to do that in amendment. 
2 I believe I have a question for you here, and let me 
3 ask you what my question was. Other than what I think is 
4 certainly alluded to, that perhaps there was a breach of the 
5 good — covenant of good faith in not considering and/or 
6 granting the REAr the request for equitable adjustment, Mr. 
7 Garrett, what other way would you say that the implied covenant 
8 of good faith and fair dealing was breached? It has to relate 
9 to express promises made probably in 2001. 
10 MR. GARRETT: It has to relate back to the promises 
11 made by Deerholt — 
12 THE COURT: BJC, right. So what kind of breach of 
13 the implied covenant — and you may well have it, but I'm going 
14 to give you a chance to plead it. I just want to know where 
15 we're going here. 
16 MR. GARRETT: Well, I'd have to think about that a 
17 little more, but I think that the breach of that covenant has 
18 to be that they covenant to pay; and they breached it. 
19 THE COURT: Isn't it a breach of the implied covenant 
20 of good faith to not pay what you had promised to pay, because 
21 that's quantum Meruit contract; and if you haven't paid, you've 
22 breached the contract. You (inaudible) need both. 
23 MR. GARRETT: Well, the other element of that, I 
24 suppose, would be the fact that he announced that he didn't 
25 have authority to make any such promise. 
-53-
1 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm not quite clear, and I 
2 think you do need to think about it, and I think that's a 
3 I legitimate request. The possible claim — and I am dismissing 
4 all claims against DMP — I want that to be very clear — 
5 I because you have not shown facts to support any contract with 
6 them. 
7 MR. GARRETT: Then see the affidavit of Nelson. 
8 THE COURT: They're not facts that materially support 
9 the claim, I find that it would be insufficient to go to the 
10 I jury; and Mr. Swenson will prepare that order. 
11 So your claim against DMP, I'm afraid I find it fails. 
12 What you have leave to do — and Irll say 20 days, unless 
13 that's not going to work work for you, is to rework a claim to 
14 show a contract implied in fact; and if you believe you can 
15 also append to -chat a second cause of action for breach of 
16 implied covenant and fair dealing that arises out of some 
17 express covenant or promise, you may also do that, but that's 
18 what you're going to be limited to. Is 20 days enough? 
19 MR. GARRETT: I understand. Now, on the unjust 
20 enrichment, does that stay in the case, your Honor? 
21 THE COURT: No, it goes — because they're existing 
22 contracts I think absolutely — their undisputable contract 
23 that dealt with subject matter. Therefore, unjust enrichment 
24 is unavailable to you. 
25 MR. GARRETT: Quantum meruit? 
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1 THE COURT: It's the same thing. I think that's been 
2 part of that confusion. They are interchangeable terms, but 
3 let's just say whether quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, 
4 what you do not have is the cause of action for a contract 
5 implied in law. As our decree has said, a contract implied in 
6 law is not a contract at all, but an obligation posed by law to 
7 do justice, even though you stated no promise was ever made or 
8 intended. 
9 Since there were promises made or intended up and down 
10 the line, you do not have that available to you in this case. 
11 It's not improper to plead them alternatively, but after three 
12 years of discovery, I find that the contract exists and that's 
13 not available to you, okay? 
14 MR. GARRETT: So the claim is reduced to a contract 
15 implied in law? 
16 THE COURT: In fact. 
17 MR. GARRETT: In fact. 
18 THE COURT: It's a pain. I mean, I have to check my 
19 notes every time, but it's implied in fact. Implied in fact 
20 contract is a contract. What it left is completely express 
21 terms. It may be all implied, it may be partly expressed and 
22 partly implied; and it arises primarily from the conduct of the 
23 parties. 
24 Although you never have to plead it with particularity 
25 of fraud, I'm asking you to plead those facts quite clearly, 
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1 okay? If you think from there you have implied covenant of 
2 good faith and fair dealing that relates to the claim, you are 
3 welcome to add that; but as currently pled, that claim is 
4 dismissed. Mr. Benard, do you think you can make an order that 
5 makes sense of all this? 
6 MR. BENARD: I can, your Honor. I do have one question, 
7 I guess. Is the Court proceeding to grant leave to amend? 
8 THE COURT; I am on the Court's motion. Now, let me 
9 just ask, Mr, Garrett, I'm assuming you're making a motion to 
10 amend to make that change? 
11 MR. GARRETT: I am, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: I just granted it. Thanks for clarifying 
13 the record. Is that what you wanted to do? Possibly not? 
14 MR. BENARD: Possibly not, because I think there — 
15 it either challenge it in the motion for leave of futility of 
16 it, or (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: You can't challenge it in the motion for 
18 leave — 
19 MR. BENARD: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: — but you can certainly challenge it in 
21 the motion to dismiss it for summary judgment if there's still 
22 nothing more to support it. I think you need to see how it's 
23 pled to know where to go. 
24 MR. BENARD: Correct. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Swenson, you'll take care of the 
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1 dismissal on yours? 
2 MR. SWENSON: I will. Thank you very much, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. GARRETT: Your Honor, if I may, I'd want to tell 
5 the Court one story about summary judgment. 
6 THE COURT: Is it in a good or bad summary? 
7 MR. GARRETT: Well, to me it was a bad. I think that 
8 it underscores something in this case. I had a case down in 
9 Utah County before a Judge who is now retired and deceased 
10 recently. I was arguing the motion for summary judgment, and 
11 he interrupted me. He said, nMr. Garrett, can you see the size 
12 of this file?" This must have been six inches thick. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. GARRETT: And he said, "With a file that big, 
15 there's got to be a question of fact." 
16 THE COURT: You said, "That is a lazy way to approach 
17 it, your Honor." You upgraded him to that comment. I think 
18 that is often the case, but I think it's not always the case. 
19 MR. GARRETT: I was just going to say I think it's 
20 appropriate for today. 
21 THE COURT: I don't think it's appropriate, but I've 
22 seen other Judges do it, to tell you the truth. I think it's 
23 our job to find our way through it. Although, I've certainly 
24 heard comments recently that if the file is too thick, you 
25 better be in Federal Court, because they've got checks to read 
-57-
it. We don't. 
MR. BENARD: We do appreciate you taking the time to 
read this, because you're very well prepared. 
THE COURT: It's always good to work with good lawyers. 
Thank you, gentlemen. 
MR. SWENSON: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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ADDENDUM "4 
RECEIVED BY 
SUITTER AXLAND 
JAN 1 9 2006 
Michael W. Homer (#1535) 
Jesse C. Trentadue (#4961) Docket Datg: 
Kevin D. Swenson (#5803) Attorneys: 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants Diversified Metal Products, Inc. 
and Diversified Control Systems, LLC 
IUU OISTMCT COUBV 
Tnird Judicial District * 
JAN J 8 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E & M SALES WEST INC., dba 
HEATSOURCE, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, and 
DIVERSIFIED CONTROL SYSTEMS, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability corporation, 
ORDER GRANTING DIVERSIFIED 
METAL PRODUCTS, INC.'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020901874 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The court having reviewed the pleadings related to Diversified Metal Products, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, and having heard oral argument on November 21, 
2005, 
HEREBY ORDERS, DECREES AND ADJUDGES: 
1. The court finds that there are not sufficient facts of any existing Contract between 
Diversified Metal Products, Inc. and Heatsource. No Contract, express or implied, existed 
between the two parties. Accordingly, the plaintiffs breach of contract claim is dismissed. For 
the same reasons, the plaintiffs cause of action against Diversified Metal Products, Inc. for 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also dismissed. 
2. Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment against Diversified Metal Products, Inc. is 
hereby dismissed. The court finds that there was a written Contract in place between Diversified 
Control Systems, LLC and the plaintiff dealing with the subject matter and preventing plaintiff 
from maintaining a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, all claims against the 
defendant Diversified Metal Products, Inc. brought by the plaintiff are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and an on merits. 
DATED this 1 ' day of December, 200/. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
District <Eb,ujUu4g£. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
R V " P ('r"7D AT D' 
Edward M. Garrett, Esq. 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
Attorneys for E & M Sales West Inc. 
dba Heatsource 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of December, 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC.'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be deposited in the United States mail, first-
class, postage prepaid to: 
Edward M. Garrett, Esq. 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Attorneys for E &M Sales West Inc. dba Heatsource 
Brent Johnson, Esq. 
Bryan K. Benard, Esq. 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -1031 
Attorneys for Bechtel Jacobs Cafnpany LLC 
